THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–19738 September flare-up, but the transition was problematic. Staff exercises held for the
officers of both formations produced dramatically unsatisfactory results when they
went beyond the improvement of static artillery warfare and small-scale raids.
“The [new army corps’] commander, General Hassan, had been present at the II
Army Corps’ [staff ] exercise,” Malashenko noted. “When it came to criticism he exhib-
ited correct judgment.” But when his own new formation was put to its first test,
at the start of the exercise it became clear that the commander and headquarters of the III
Army Corps are very poorly prepared, ... incapable of organizing and preparing an offen-
sive operation. We had to teach and advise them on elementary matters. For a long time
after the crossing, the headquarters could not establish communications and control.
Toward the end of the exercise, as usual, our material was submitted to Riad.But the advisers were excluded from the final debriefing, to prevent embarrass-
ment. Afterward, Riad told his Soviet adviser: “if we conduct an offensive operation
and liberate Sinai ... I will ask the president to give you a villa in a nice place on the
Mediterranean. We will both retire and be neighbors.” But, Malashenko concluded
wistfully, this was not to happen during his tenure in Eg ypt.
When the offensive did materialize in October 1973, either the Soviets’ idea to
divide the front between two army corps or its still-faulty implementation would
produce calamitous results. The cusp between the two formations would become the
corridor for the Israeli counterthrust across the canal that reversed the course of the
war.^5 The advisers, Malashenko claims, foresaw an Israeli counter-crossing almost as
early as the II Army Corps’ staff exercise in the summer of 1968:
When I described an episode in which Israeli forces beyond the Mitla Pass, despite the
Eg yptian forces’ superiority, hold back [the Eg yptians’] advance, land a counterblow and
send a force across the Bitter Lake to the west bank, Riad said that this episode was not so
realistic as the Eg yptian forces would have superiority in numbers. They would be attack-
ing and the enemy retreating. I reminded him that during the fighting in Sinai [in 1967]
the enemy, though it lacked overall superiority, scored a success by massive use of air power
and skillful maneuvering. ... Many Eg yptian generals and officers, [including Generals
Ahmed Ismail and Gamasy] could not understand the character of modern operations and
reduced everything to calculations of numerical proportions.The scenario that the advisers tried to rehearse would actually transpire in ’73: “the
enemy outflanked them, penetrated the rear and threatened to surround a numeri-
cally superior force.”
Organizing the III Army Corps and transferring the southern sector to its control
required yet another group of advisers, and even reducing qualification requirements
for younger officers did not suffice to fill the quota. Those old-timers that were
recruited now were also not as gung-ho as the first contingent. Col. Mikhail Filonov,
who had served with the Syrian Army before and during the Six-Day War and