THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973rocket systems, whose upgraded multiple and mobile launchers would help to balance
the heavier but shorter-range Z e’ev; two brand-new shoulder-fired missiles, the anti-
tank Malyutka (Sagger) and anti-aircraft Strela-2 (SAM-7), as well as fording equip-
ment. But he frankly told Nasser that the Eg yptian military should be reinforced “in
useful proportions,” and ruled out certain requests such as replacing tanks with newer
models. As is, Lashchenko warned, the aid to Eg ypt cost the USSR heavily and tilted
its industry excessively toward military production.
That Nasser nonetheless decorated Lashchenko indicates the esteem the general
had earned. Although the Eg yptians had trouble spelling his name (which helps to
account for his total neglect in Western studies), and resented his rejection of their
complaints about Soviet weapons based on combat experience, they remembered him
gratefully.^8 In Moscow too, Lashchenko’s subsequent assignments attest that he was
not recalled from Eg ypt due to perceived failure there or excessive support for
Nasser’s offensive ambitions. He was promoted to general of the army, made deputy
commander of ground forces, and remained on call as an authority on Eg ypt in gen-
eral and the canal crossing plan in particular.
Lashchenko introduced Nasser to his successor Ivan Katyshkin, who in a portent
of things soon to come was now, in addition to chief adviser, designated “head of the
Soviet operational group in Eg ypt.”^9 But despite this upgraded status, Katyshkin did
not retain the same access to the Eg yptian leader—perhaps because he did not keep
up his predecessor’s constant drive for action and results. Malashenko does not hide
his contempt for the new chief adviser: as Lashchenko’s deputy, Katyshkin
had not shouldered much work and had not visited the troops on the canal. Now he did
develop activity—[but] with special attention to preparing reports for Moscow, which he
amended to enhance the actual situation, the results of the advisers’ work, and the improve-
ment of Eg yptian forces under his leadership. Sometimes he would personally write coded
cables to this effect.Despite Malashenko’s admitted bias, at least some of his disdain was evidently well
founded. Lower-ranking advisers also describe Katyshkin as coarse, blustering, and
mainly ineffectual.^10 After he was replaced in September 1970, Katyshkin—unlike
Lashchenko—was kicked upstairs to head the training institute for military linguists,
at whom he had openly and gratuitously sneered in Eg ypt. One of them spitefully
recalled the general’s frequent remark: “we have two adversaries, the Israelis and the
interpreters.”^11
Besides his trouble with Katyshkin, Malashenko needed surgery. He soon
requested a reassignment, and with Lashchenko’s support obtained it—after the
major artillery duels resumed in March, when the Bar-Lev Line was already approach-
ing completion. Meanwhile, the Soviet advisers, at least those posted with the land
forces, appear to have had a dysfunctional leadership that hardly kept up their former
dedication to proactive input.