FACING THE BAR-LEV LINEIn the short term, however, the relative successes of the autumn of 1968 were
reflected in the tone of an Eg yptian directive issued in January ’69 on “organization
[and] method of advisers’ activity.” “The Russian experts,” as declared in the preamble,
were there “at the request of the UAR in order to benefit from their practical specializa-
tion for improving combat capability.” They were assigned to “units and sub-units” and
would enjoy the same privileges as these outfits’ own officers. Eg yptian commanders
were instructed to treat them with “mutual respect” and to “ensure an atmosphere of
creative cooperation”—while eschewing any political or ideological discussion. They
were to “remove all obstacles” and provide all information and documentation needed
for the advisers’ functioning so that the latter could elaborate “realistic” recommenda-
tions. Disagreements were not to be debated in front of the troops.^12
C. Air activity intensifies, and accelerates the Phantom deal
If intensity of ground activity subsided, the air advisers showed that this was not due
to any radical change in Eg yptian or Soviet intentions or plans. Here too, the advisers
could be described as emulating Panfilov. As early as July 1968, an Israeli commenta-
tor close to the intelligence community reported that the Soviet pilot-instructors
were leading formations of Eg yptian planes on operational missions, to demonstrate
both air combat and ground attack techniques.^13 By 13 October, Israel’s “official
commentator” Chaim Herzog stated that the Soviets were “presumably” flying in
Eg ypt as well as Syria, and were “very deeply involved in the EAF’s electronic infra-
structure.”^14 Authoritative Western sources in Paris stated as a fact that “the Russian
pilots are making joint flights with the Eg yptians.”^15
The result became evident on 22 October, when the New York Times reported,
from Washington sources, a substantial rise in both the sophistication and the audac-
ity of Eg yptian air sorties into Sinai. Several plane models were now being deployed
simultaneously, with MiG-17s and Su-7s coming in low for photoreconnaissance
missions and MiG-21s covering them higher up over the canal. The Eg yptian Air
Force (the Times’ sources said), under the management of Soviet advisers, had been
dispersed to a number of new airstrips, even taking off from straight sections of high-
way. The use of such improvised fields close to the canal, rather than the permanent
and closely monitored bases, for one-time “ambushes” would be perfected by regular
Soviet squadrons before too long. Soviet technicians, the Times reported, were man-
ning Eg yptian radar stations, and Soviet pilots were actually carrying out certain
reconnaissance flights.
This item obviously represented a tendentious leak from US elements interested in
aircraft sales to Israel: it stressed that Israel’s strategic situation had worsened, with its
greatest inferiority being in the air. A US official pointed out that Israel had yet to
replace the forty to fifty supersonic craft that it had lost since 1967, and its sixty-five
Mirages were vastly outnumbered.^16 The context was obvious: the subsonic Skyhawks