A NEW PHASE FROM MARCH ’69?Middle East and Vietnam—in that order—could proceed “in parallel and simultane-
ously” with SALT, rather than as a precondition.^11
Kissinger had judged condescendingly that Dobrynin’s “comprehension is imper-
fect; consequently, important points must be made in simple words and relatively
slowly.”^12 Dobrynin’s comprehension was, however, acute enough to deduce rapidly
that “relations between him [Kissinger] and Nixon are indeed very close,” and that
Kissinger was “quite vain ... not averse to boasting ... without excessive modesty.”^13
KGB rezident (station chief ) Kalugin likewise concluded, based on wiretaps of
Kissinger’s phone calls, that he was “vain and boastful.”^14 The following chapters will
outline how, for the coming years, the Soviets would exploit both Kissinger’s vanity
and his linkage concept by holding Vietnam, SALT and other elements of his signa-
ture détente as hostages to press him into concessions on the Middle East.
Remarkably, in his foreword to the collection of their parallel reports, Kissinger
admits in effect that he misrepresented the president’s approach to Dobrynin:
Nixon ... did not think it possible to conduct simultaneous negotiations with the Soviet
Union, China, the Vietnamese and the Middle East parties. He had made up his mind to
make the Middle East a centerpiece of his foreign policy in the second term ... During
Nixon’s first term, my role on the Middle East in the Channel was largely a watching brief.^15“This”—Kissinger states—“was accomplished by confining the channel to elabo-
ration of principles to guide the substantive negotiations being carried out by the
State Department.” He is correct that these “efforts to stabilize the region pro-
ceeded desultorily.” Through the initial months of the administration, both he and
the Soviet ambassador repeatedly dismissed, as “talks for talk’s sake” and “window-
dressing,” the two-power talks, the four-power talks, the attempts to revive the
Jarring mission and so on—the fine points of which make up the bulk of the peri-
od’s historiography. But it is only one of Kissinger’s many retrospective stretchers
that “Dobrynin correctly conveyed the White House’s reluctance to use the
Channel for detailed Middle East negotiations.”
Actually, by 21 February Dobrynin reported that Kissinger saw their exchange on
the Middle East as important—and, in the Soviet ambassador’s first meeting with the
president, he was told clearly that Nixon “would like to further develop ... confiden-
tial channels ... designating Kissinger, his chief aide, for such contacts.”^16 This was
after Dobrynin had delivered to Nixon a note from the Soviet leadership, which,
though referring to all of Israel’s neighbors, reflected particular Soviet concern that
the incipient Bar-Lev Line might become a permanent border.^17 The note deplored
that “Israel continues to follow aggressive and expansionist aims,” and warned that
“the Arabs and their supporters cannot agree.” As there was still “not much progress”
in the “consultations” begun at the United Nations by Ambassador Charles Yost with
his Soviet counterpart Yakov Malik, Kissinger now explicitly proposed that the mat-
ter be handled through “the Kissinger/Soviet ambassador channel.”^18