THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Dobrynin quickly obtained approval from Moscow—with a directive to highlight
the issue of Israeli withdrawal. Kissinger promised to propose a “mechanism” for the
new channel within a week—and demanded to keep it secret from Secretary of State
William Rogers, Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco (who had just been formally put in
charge of Middle Eastern affairs) and Yost. Dobrynin inferred from this that
Kissinger “himself intends to play an active role.”^19 Kissinger thus intended the chan-
nel to supplant, if not undermine, the diplomatic process rather than to “guide” it.
Kissinger requested a delay; he reckoned the back-channel talks could begin
within a month. The Americans sensed no urgency: in a talk with French President
Charles de Gaulle, Nixon had already interpreted the all-but-overt threat in the
Soviets’ message as a sign that they “might be as alarmed about the situation in the
Middle East as we.”^20 For the first time but not the last, Kissinger would be blindsided
by the Soviets and Eg yptians.
B. 8–9 March: did the Soviets initiate or just join in?
On 8 March, “around noon Eg yptian MiG-21s crossed the canal. ... After 6 hours ...
Eg yptian artillery opened fire all along the canal in order to wipe out the Israeli line of
fortifications.”^21 Since 1967, Eg yptian spokesmen had been pointing out Israel’s relative
vulnerability to casualties and to protracted disruption of its economy by the mobiliza-
tion of reservists that would be required for major hostilities. Heikal had introduced
the term “attrition strateg y” in late February 1969 to describe concerted pressure on
Israel from several Arab fronts.^22 He wrote again in his Friday column on 7 March that
Eg ypt could withstand 500,000 fatalities better than Israel could take 10,000.
The cannonade was not initially recognized in Israel as a substantive turning point.
Foreign Minister Eban, on his way to the first high-level discussions with the new US
administration, predicted that “the exchanges of fire ... will not lead to a major fla-
reup, because Eg ypt knows well that it cannot sustain one. It was a grave violation of
the ceasefire, but no more.” Still, he warned Nixon that “the Arabs are trying to stir
up a war psychosis with active Soviet support.” Israeli correspondents were concerned
that the president had actually been impressed by “Soviet readiness to reach an
accommodation”; pundits opined that his fear of confrontation with the USSR was
excessive, as Moscow was focused on border clashes with China, which had escalated
into pitched battle on 2 March.^23
If current events had anything to do with the timing of the barrage, Eg ypt was
probably more mindful of a brief interregnum in Israel. Eg yptian officers claimed to
David Korn that Nasser had in mid-February issued “battle orders,” after hearing
pleas from low- and mid-level commanders while visiting the front line. Eg yptian
soldiers were now permitted, and in effect encouraged, to fire at will at any Israeli
they spotted.^24 In the first week of February, sniping across the canal reached such
intensity that the Israelis suspected a special unit of sharpshooters had been brought