THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973F. “Better than the Hawk!”
The Soviets’ strict secrecy could now be relaxed somewhat, though they never con-
firmed their regulars’ presence: Heikal relates that when a shipment of missiles
arrived in Alexandria “a few days” after 18 April, the Eg yptians tried to unload it
clandestinely but the Soviets insisted on a festive motorcade through the streets.
Heikal suggested (from his viewpoint in 1976) “that the Russians had told the
Americans in advance.” But either he misdates the event or—more likely—his refer-
ence to it as the first SAM-3 shipment is intentionally misleading, to support his
account of Nasser’s visit and agreement in January.^39
By early March 1970, Israeli pundits who had previously dismissed any prospect
of direct Soviet intervention were conceding retrospectively that it had been on the
cards since Moscow approved Nasser’s declaration of the War of Attrition. They now
held that although the “Sovietization” of the conflict would probably be limited by
its predictable consequences, the Kremlin’s brinkmanship had to be met resolutely.^40
This line, however, was hard to market in Washington. Very little materialized out of
the “grave consequences” for the Soviets that Kissinger had threatened. Instead, on
21 March, Nixon upstaged a scheduled statement by Secretary of State Rogers to
announce an “interim decision” not to supply Israel during 1971 with the additional
twenty-five Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks that it had requested. This, he asserted, had
been determined before the stationing of Soviet missiles in Eg ypt was detected.^41
According to Smirnov, the first of his division’s SAM-3 batteries became operational
on the night of 24–5 March. The first missile it launched brought down another
Eg yptian Il-28 with an “Arab” crew flying at 200–250 meters. The Soviets were aghast
and considered repatriating the officers responsible. They were amazed when an
Eg yptian air defense division chief, Maj.-Gen. Mohammed Bassiouny, joyfully
described it as a success, presumably as it proved the system’s much-awaited efficacy
against low-altitude incursions. “All the hundreds of Eg yptian officers and men who
witnessed the plane being shot down cheered: ‘better than the [US-supplied Israeli
missile] Hawk! Better than the Hawk!’” When Smirnov offered his condolences to
Eg yptian Chief of Staff Muhammad Sadiq, the latter rejected any apolog y and instead
praised the Soviet units that had come to Eg ypt’s aid.^42 Recalling the incident to
Al-Ahram, Smirnov blamed the Eg yptian airmen: “The pilots did not give the necessary
signals and so we shot them down. We wanted to reprimand the Soviet officer [who
fired the missile], but the Eg yptians said, ‘No, it was the pilot’s mistake.’”^43
Smirnov confirms contemporary reports that Israel avoided clashes with the Soviet
air defense system as long as it was limited to protecting targets deep in Eg yptian
territory. IAF chief Hod proposed to the General Staff “to attack one of the Soviet
batteries, and thus to signal Israel’s displeasure. ... Hod’s proposal was not adopted at
this stage, and the IAF was instructed not to go near the area manned by Soviet
units.”^44 The Israeli reconnaissance flights, Smirnov recalls, approached only Eg yptian