OPERATION KAVKAZ IS FORMALLY ORGANIZEDformations, and the Soviet SAMs registered little success when fired at targets at the
outer fringe of their range.^45
“Shortly after” Hod’s suggestion was rejected,
the Eg yptians began digging new T-shaped emplacements close to the canal sector. The
IAF estimated that the Eg yptians intended to advance the SAM-3 batteries to the front
line, and thus to threaten the Israeli planes that continued to operate along the canal. The
same day, it was decided to prevent the Eg yptians from bringing the missiles closer to the
canal than their 30-km range. ... The battle began to prevent the advance of the missile
batteries, while also hitting Eg yptian radar systems. ... Heavy casualties did not deter the
Eg yptians from keeping up construction, which was held up significantly so long as Israeli
fire continued.^46After the 1973 war, Allon recalled that in March 1970 “we had a cabinet discus-
sion about the first appearance of SAM-3s in the Eg yptian array near the canal. ...
There was an argument about the operational significance of this weapon [for] a
crossing.” Suitably for the Russian context, Allon cited the “Chekhov’s gun” princi-
ple: once positioned to cover a canal crossing, the missiles would eventually have to
do so.^47
G. US acquiescence in “unacknowledged” Soviet presence
In a back-channel meeting on 7 April, Kissinger vented his annoyance at being “tricked
by the Soviet introduction of SAM-3s.” Dobrynin countered that the missiles were
“purely defensive,” and insisted (according to Kissinger) that the ceasefire offer still
stood. “He then asked tentatively what we would say if the Soviets promised to keep
their deployment confined to Alexandria, Cairo and the Aswan Dam.” Kissinger
reported that he agreed to consider the offer—thus effectively acquiescing in the Soviet
intervention so long as it remained “defensive,” despite his previous remonstration.
Dobrynin’s report quotes Kissinger as admitting that the United States “can under-
stand that the deployment ... is defensive, but it agrees with Israel that placing such
systems in the Suez Canal zone is quite different.” Kissinger promised to consult
Nixon without delay, but Dobrynin “sensed from his confident tone that his remarks
... had already been approved by Nixon himself ”—who, as Kissinger admitted in his
own report, “did not take the same active interest in the Middle East negotiations as
he did ... on Vietnam and SALT.”^48
Their next meeting, two days later, was marked mainly by Dobrynin’s pleasant
surprise at Kissinger’s proposal to schedule a US–Soviet summit conference, which
would focus mainly on the latter issues, though “the agenda could also include pre-
liminary discussions of ways to reach a Middle East settlement.” Kissinger indi-
cated—in his own words—that “the key to our attitude on the Middle East” would
be the Soviet stance on Vietnam, since Nixon was elected without the Jewish vote