THE SOVIET–ISRAELI BATTLE IS JOINEDthe disdain he professed to Kissinger for “the petty legalism of Sisco’s approach,”
Dobrynin told the State Department chiefs that he was authorized to continue talks
on the Middle East with them, and presented “new formulations” of previous Soviet
proposals on a peace settlement. Rogers responded with a written protest of the
Soviet military involvement in Eg ypt. Dobrynin not only was unfazed, but reported
to Moscow that the talk had “demonstrated the efficacy of ... conducting a ‘construc-
tive dialog’ with the United States while strengthening the ‘defensive capability’ of
Eg ypt”—in other words, that the best way to prevent a forceful US response was to
keep on playing the rivals within the administration against each other.^37
Six days later, Rogers invited Dobrynin for a “secret, unofficial conversation”—pre-
cisely what Kissinger’s back channel was supposed to provide. The secretary indicated
that the Americans were “seriously considering” a ceasefire and indirect talks to be
conducted by Jarring (what was to become the “Rogers Plan II”). A delighted
Dobrynin reported that at last the Nixon administration was coming around, and
“the most important factor in this was our military presence in the UAR, first of all
Soviet pilots and missiles.”^38
Kissinger sensed that the Soviet ambassador was avoiding him and initiated a
restart of the back-channel talks.^39 They met on 10 June, and Nixon joined them
for part of their lengthy talk. Dobrynin pointedly dismissed much of what
Kissinger had to offer on the specifics of a settlement, saying that Rogers had
already made the proposal to him. Kissinger did, however, have something entirely
new. In his memoirs, he would relate telling Dobrynin that it was “crucial for us to
know whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to withdraw its military forces
as part of a negotiated peace.”^40 Kissinger’s contemporary report differs only
slightly: “I told him that for us the presence of Soviet combat personnel in Eg ypt
was a matter of the very gravest consequences. ... I therefore wanted to know
whether, assuming that there was a peace settlement, the Soviet Union would be
prepared to withdraw its combat personnel.”
After making sure that this meant the withdrawal would come only after the agree-
ment, Dobrynin said the idea was “conceivable” and—according to Kissinger’s
report—promised a reply at their next meeting.^41
Nixon and Kissinger congratulated each other, with the latter indulging in charac-
teristic flattery for the president.^42 But as usual, the parallel Soviet document reflects
Kissinger’s inquiry somewhat differently:
Wouldn’t Moscow consider it possible to somehow tell them—in any form and on a
strictly confidential basis—that it has no intention of maintaining its military presence
in the UAR even after a final settlement and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, i.e., that at
that time there will be no Soviet pilots there carrying out combat missions, or Soviet
personnel of anti-aircraft missile systems or infantry units (“we know that they are not
there now, but who knows what may happen tomorrow”). In that case, it would be easier