THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973for the US Government, despite all the domestic criticism and Israel’s objections ... to
start looking for specific compromise recommendations that Jarring needs in order to
organize talks ... even before the midterm elections ... although that “may involve certain
domestic policy costs.”The latter costs, Kissinger specified, might include the much-feared electoral dam-
age of limiting arms sales to Israel.
Dobrynin reported that he sensed—and warned against—a US attempt to take
over any Israeli–Eg yptian talks and exclude the USSR.^43 He did not report promis-
ing, nor did he recommend that Moscow give, an urgent answer on the withdrawal
question. He had little reason to do so. Kissinger had in effect accepted the Soviet
presence in the canal zone too for the foreseeable future. Activity of both the Soviet
fighters and SAMs was intensified, and as much as declared. Radio Moscow in Arabic
warned that just as Israel’s deep-penetration raids had been halted, IAF activity in the
canal zone would also not remain beyond reach.^44
F. Soviet MiG-21s engage the IAF
On 17 May 1970, Nastenko’s MiG-21s were assigned a forward “reserve” base at
Katameya, an enlarged stretch of highway 40 kilometers from the Suez Canal. Six
planes were stationed there, in camouflaged underground bunkers, to “ambush”
Israeli attackers. By the beginning of June, each Soviet pilot had logged 100 flight
hours or more, but no dogfights had occurred. On 22 June, a pair of Soviet pilots
claimed the first kill from such ambush tactics.^45 Nastenko’s detailed account claims
that early in the morning Eg yptian radar at Gianaclis spotted a formation of
Skyhawks heading toward Ismailia:
Other marks also briefly flashed on the radar and these were quickly identified as the Mirages
of a covering group which were flying at lower altitude. Immediately some MiG-21s took off,
climbed and lured the Mirages. A swirling dogfight then began. Meanwhile a pair of Soviet
MiG-21s led by Captain Sal’nikov flew at only 10m altitude towards Ismailia and was soon
on the tail of the Israeli Skyhawks. Next day the Soviet squadron was sent some wreckage
from a Skyhawk which had come down on the western bank of the canal.^46This was never confirmed by the IAF, whose bulletin for that day’s action was
entirely routine: MiGs had approached the Skyhawks, but no contact was made.^47
However, Israel’s suppression of similar incidents a month later—in which a
Skyhawk was badly damaged—indicates that in this respect its official accounts may
not be much more reliable than the Soviets’. Nastenko might be suspected of conflat-
ing two events, or simply confusing June with July, except that the particulars differ
substantially. The 22 June incident is reported in detail by multiple Russian sources.
Nastenko first mentioned it publicly as early as the 1980s. In addition, one of the
pilots describing engagements in July notes that a Skyhawk had already been shot