THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973As the Soviets had been approached about the U-2 flights, they were aware that
the Americans lacked conclusive evidence of this provision’s violation. Vinogradov
was confident enough to respond derisively when Klosson “began by submitting his
government’s protest at the Eg yptians’ behavior.”
“The matter is,” the American diplomat fumed, “that the Eg yptians are moving forces in
their territory, which is not permissible under the agreement for a standstill ceasefire!” I
rejected the chargé’s pretenses, and declared that Eg ypt, like any sovereign state, could do
as it pleased in its own territory. We were not aware of any commitment that Eg yptian
soldiers would stand still, and suppose some soldier had to go somewhere—would he have
to ask permission from the Americans or Israelis? The expression “stand still” that the
Americans used is known to mean “stand at attention,” and it is not applicable to relations
between states, regardless of whether for any reason it appeared in the agreement or not.
This is legalistic nonsense.^20No US record of this exchange—or what instructions Klosson acted on—has yet
surfaced. Subsequent reports of US–Soviet discussions, and even the meticulous
notes of FRUS editors, do not mention it. But while Vinogradov’s smug account may
have been enhanced somewhat in hindsight, it conforms to his statements in later
talks—none of which were on a Sunday—and there is no reason to suppose that he
fabricated it entirely.^21 Some explanation for the apparent suppression of the episode
may be provided by the infighting that ensued in San Clemente.
Craig Daigle has documented how the muddled US response—like the unhappy
choice, by the State Department, of the codename Even Steven for the U-2 flights—
stemmed from Rogers’s insistence on demonstrating American impartiality and
preventing any disruption of the Jarring talks, which were to resume under his plan.
On the other hand, so long as the ceasefire appeared to hold, Kissinger could not
resist voicing to the media his resentment at the very phrase “Rogers’s proposals”—
and claiming they had been worked out by his NSC over eight months.^22 But once
the Soviet–Eg yptian violations were established, he was quick, in consultations with
Nixon, to pounce on the secretary’s failure and demand a stiff response toward the
Soviets.^23 The result was a deadlock.
Meanwhile, as Dayan put it in his memoirs, “The Eg yptians, or to be more precise
the Soviets, thumbed their nose at the agreement including its standstill provision. ...
The United States, to which we turned to decry this, first tried to evade it.”^24 He was
apparently unaware of Klosson’s abortive protest, and took out his frustration on the
Americans. A day or two after the U-2 flights started, that is, on 10 or 11 August, the
American deputy chief of mission in Tel Aviv (ambassadors everywhere were hard to
find on duty in August) was told by a “furious” Dayan that the “U-2 had deviated
from the 5-km flight corridor that the [defense] ministry had assigned it. The agree-
ment between Israel and the US called for the U-2 to look only at dispositions on the
Eg yptian side ... If the deviation happened again, Israel would shoot down the U-2.”