CEASEFIRE VIOLATION SEALS A STRATEGIC GAINWhen the incredulous diplomat asked how this could be accomplished, Dayan
explained that a Phantom would be sent under the spy plane’s flight path and fire a
missile upwards—precisely the stratagem that would be tried, unsuccessfully, against
Soviet MiG-25s two years later. Dayan’s response to another question, whether he
understood the consequences of such a shootdown, is not recorded.^25
With no American reaction evident, the Israelis increased their pressure by leaking
the detected violations to the press, with an emphasis on the Soviet role. British
journalist Jon Kimche—whose brother and frequent co-author David was then a
senior Mossad officer—reported on 11 August in the London Evening Standard
from “Israeli sources” that the Soviets had, “recently” and especially on Friday night,
brought into the canal zone new equipment that they had not risked introducing
before, thus violating the standstill provision.^26 Israel’s all-but-official commentator
Herzog in effect confirmed the report.
Jon Kimche hedged his claim by explaining to an interviewer that the Soviet move
was made “on the threshold” of the ceasefire.^27 But much greater commotion was
created the next day, when the Los Angeles Times published a description closely
resembling the Israeli pilot’s account: how a convoy began under cover of the final
Eg yptian artillery barrage; how the SAMs were repositioned within four hours; how
the violation was discovered on Sunday and immediately reported to the United
States.^28 For another fortnight there was no US counteraction, not even a further
diplomatic demarche, toward the Soviets. After the latest American EW pods failed
on 18 July, USAF expert Brog had seconded the IAF’s request for Shrike radiation-
seeking missiles to counter the SAM radars. To placate the Israelis, on 14 August
Ambassador Rabin was told that Nixon had approved the Shrikes among other new
arms sales. But Washington still lacked, or professed to lack, hard proof that the
Eg yptians, let alone the Soviets, had broken their word.^29
Dayan summed it up: “The Eg yptians and Russians ... did not pull back the bat-
teries and we did not send our delegate to the Jarring talks.”^30 Continued Even Steven
flights spotted more, undisputedly new SAM sites—that is, such that had been
deployed after 10 August.^31 Besides the advance of Soviet divizyons, the massive for-
ward movement of Eg yptian batteries was facilitated by new Soviet transfers of both
weapons and personnel: the SAM-6 batteries that had been promised to Nasser in
June were deployed in August around the Aswan Dam, releasing Eg yptian SAM-2
formations for positions closer to the front.^32 The introduction of ten Soviet-manned
SAM-6 launchers “supported by anti-aircraft artillery crews and base security troops”
was disclosed to the US press only after Sadat declared their “expulsion” two years
later.^33 New EW systems were also supplied by August and installed, with Soviet
operators, both in the canal zone and around Cairo.