CEASEFIRE VIOLATION SEALS A STRATEGIC GAINagreed on ceasefire/standstill in hope that it would lead to serious talks and political solu-
tion. Violations are serious, and both USSR and UAR would be taking on heavy respon-
sibility if they should lead to breakdown in peace efforts.^36But Beam made no further attempt to press the issue in Moscow, and the break-
down had already occurred.
Kissinger, in stark contrast to his bravado in Nixon’s presence, did not bring up the
ceasefire violations at all in his few back-channel contacts during August and much
of September (through the Soviet chargé Yuly Vorontsov; Ambassador Dobrynin too
was on home leave). Sonnenfeldt went so far as to warn his boss on 16 September:
“we may have (unwittingly) misled the Soviets to believe that cheating on the cease-
fire was a matter of indifference to us and that we may have thereby contributed to a
potentially much deeper crisis.”^37 But by then, a flap over a suspected new Soviet base
in Cuba had eclipsed the Middle East at the top of Kissinger’s agenda.
Even within the region, American attention was distracted by the hijacking of four
airliners to Jordan and the worsening crisis there, where Palestinian, Iraqi and finally
Syrian forces challenged the Hashemite regime.^38 The direct Soviet backing for this
effort is beyond the scope of this study, but it merits mention that Kissinger reported
being told by Dobrynin: “we might not believe it but the Soviet Union had not
known of the invasion of Jordan by Syria and ... in any event Soviet advisors had
dropped off Syrian tanks prior to crossing the frontier. I [Kissinger] let this somewhat
contradictory statement go.”^39 This pattern would be repeated in October 1973. For
the time being, the prime concern in Washington was whether an Israeli intervention
in Jordan with US approval would send the Suez ceasefire “out the window,” as
Admiral Moorer expected. On 9 September, Sisco still spoke of this only as a hypo-
thetical response to such Israeli action:
Mr Sisco: ... The Eg yptians would probably move some of the SAMs closer to the Canal.
Also, Russian pilots would likely become more involved. ... Nasser would have to step up
his campaign against Israel in some way—probably by small, showy raids.
Mr Helms: He might undertake a bombardment of the Bar Lev line.^40So, Kissinger reported that when on 25 September he finally saw Dobrynin, “the
Ambassador tried to discuss ... the Middle East ... I cut him off.”^41
Dobrynin, who had initiated the meeting in connection with the Soviet clients’
ultimate defeat in Jordan’s “Black September,” reported that Kissinger actually made
“lengthy arguments ‘about the major Soviet share of responsibility’ for ... moving
missile launchers in the Suez Canal Zone.” But Dobrynin claimed that he again
“flatly rejected” these charges, and went on to protest the “slanderous anti-Soviet
campaign” in this matter. “Kissinger,” he reported, “in effect confirmed the correct-
ness of my remarks, although he made all sorts of excuses.”^42 By 6 October, Dobrynin