THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973was calling the violations “fabricated” and threatening damage to US–USSR rela-
tions.^43 NSC staffer Harold Saunders, after examining the U-2 photos, concluded
that “activity is not leveling off ... [the] defensive missile complex means more to the
Eg yptians than peace talks.”^44 Even Secretary Rogers had by then come around to the
view that for the Soviets, improving their military position took precedence over
restarting the Jarring mission. He attributed this to the situation in Southeast Asia.^45
D. Israel’s hollow declaration of victory
While Israeli leaders decried the SAM move to the Americans, they tried to play its
significance down for domestic consumption. An official “victory album” on the War
of Attrition signed off on the note that the conflict “ends with an Eg yptian rout.
Eg ypt does not fulfill its obligations, but rather advances and reinforces its AA array
in the canal zone. However, fighting does not resume. Israel is ready for a peaceful
solution, but prepared for war.”^46 Journalists well connected in the establishment were
encouraged to write in a similar vein. Arnold Sherman, who for years had worked
with the aviation and military industries, ended an English-language book that he
published shortly after the ceasefire with a rather ominous epilogue. Giving the exact
specifications of the SAM systems that were advanced after the ceasefire took effect
(and even of the trucks used to move them), he wrote that “the ugly meaning was
clear: by violating the ceasefire agreement, Soviet missiles had achieved a measure of
control over Israeli air space. Israeli aircraft could be destroyed before they ever
approached the border.” A Hebrew version that appeared a few months later added
“but Israel has sought—and also found—the appropriate solution for this, too.”^47
The IAF’s rationale for accepting the ceasefire was to gain time for developing
countermeasures to the SAMs. The force’s chief of operations at the time, Ya’aqov
Agassi, relates that a plan for a massive attack on the SAM array was ready for imple-
mentation at the expected expiry of the ceasefire on 7 November.^48 He may have
alluded to the plan for a Shrike missile barrage that was finally launched only a year
later, with very disappointing results. In January 1971, Aviation Week reported that
although Shrikes were being mounted on Israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks, IAF com-
manders were unsure of the missiles’ effectiveness as they did not have the Soviet
systems’ frequencies, and therefore preferred that ground forces should strike the first
blow at the SAMs.^49
IDF ops chief Weizmann, who had pressed to start the air war, conceded famously
that “the missiles dented [our] planes’ wings.” IAF chief Hod repudiated this admis-
sion even as late as 1984.^50 But over time more candid assessments by his then-subor-
dinates recognized that Israel had been defeated, mainly due to the Soviet SAMs’
upper hand against the Phantoms. Even before the loss of its commander Hetz and
senior WSO Eini, the latter felt that the first F-4 squadron “was indeed in a great
crisis.”^51 An airbase commander at the time, Col. Aharon “Yalu” Shavit, admitted