THE DEAL AT THE SUMMIT AND THE “EXPULSION” MYTHof the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade reported finding a copy of a Soviet youth
magazine in the troops’ quarters. It turned out to have been distributed, along with
other Soviet publications, on a regular basis, by an adviser whose name was garbled
into “Nualov, Fladimir.” The Eg yptian officer requested instructions whether this was
permissible, and apparently was told that it wasn’t, as Nualov’s subsequent record
indicates he was removed—temporarily.^17
C. The timing of Sadat’s “sudden decision”
Sadat is conventionally held to have first informed Vinogradov “on the spur of the
moment” on 8 July 1972 that “effective 17 July, the services of the Soviet military
advisers would no longer be required.”^18 This rests almost entirely on Eg yptian
sources: a report in Akhbar al-Yawm on 22 July that Sadat’s decision was made ten
days before his public announcement on the 18th, and Heikal’s detailed report about
Sadat’s move in Al-Ahram on 28 Ju l y.^19 This version was expanded in Heikal’s books
and endorsed in Sadat’s memoirs.^20
The date of 8 July was first approximately confirmed by a former Soviet source with
the publication of the diary that was begun in 1972 by Anatoly Chernyaev, then
Ponomarev’s deputy at the Central Committee International Department. In the
entry for 15 July, he wrote: “Last Sunday [9 July], Anwar Sadat demanded immediate
withdrawal of Soviet specialists and all Soviet military from Eg ypt—to protest the
fact that he wasn’t given what was promised to him during his last meeting with
Brezhnev in Moscow. Namely, offensive weapons and Su-17 fighter-bombers. There
was a commotion.”^21 This, however, only illustrates how such a mid-level official was
not informed about the withdrawal negotiations before, during and after the summit:
he equates the “specialists” with “all Soviet military,” and—as will be demonstrated—
the Su-17s (initially, the Su-20 export version) were already being delivered.
An authoritative, post-Soviet Russian history of Israel states that Sadat’s “unex-
pected” decision was made only on 13 July—the day Eg yptian Prime Minister Aziz
Sidqi began “a friendly working visit” in Moscow.^22 The CIA estimated, after learning
about Sadat’s imminent announcement one day before it was made, that Brezhnev
was informed about it when he met Sidqi on the 14th—that is, the day before
Chernyaev heard about it.^23 To Chernyaev, the visit was described as a Soviet initiative
following Sadat’s move: “We persuaded Sedki ... to come to Moscow.”
Sidqi would have been Sadat’s natural choice for an extremely sensitive and confi-
dential mission of coordination with the Soviets. The “shy,” civilian, Harvard-trained
prime minister had made his career in economic positions dating back to Nasser’s day,
focusing on industrialization and modernization of Eg ypt with Soviet aid but also
developing ties with Western corporations.^24 Sidqi had been instrumental in bringing
Sadat to power, thus gaining his trust.^25 As first deputy prime minister, he had led the
economic aid negotiations in Moscow in March 1971, when in meetings with