THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Brezhnev and Kosygin he secured Soviet credits for a five-year plan stressing con-
sumer products and rural electrification. But he was also trusted with a message to
Sadat following up on the latter’s talks, which preceded the ceasefire abrogation.^26
During the May 1971 power struggle in Cairo, Sidqi was the first to publicly support
Sadat against the “sowers of division and conspiracy” and appealed to “the working
masses,” without mentioning the “plotters’” supposed Soviet sympathies.^27 In January
1972, he replaced Sadat’s first prime minister, Mahmud Fawzy, who was shifted to
vice president; Sidqi’s promotion was interpreted as a reward for personal loyalty, and
he was deemed “neutral” in foreign affairs.^28 But before long he was billed as heading
a “war cabinet,” and described as “Russia’s man in Cairo, as Sabry used to be.”^29
His statements grew steadily more aggressive: while Sadat’s other vice-president,
Hussein Shafei, called for waging guerilla operations in Sinai, Sidqi initially held that
war should be initiated only when Eg ypt was ready and as a last resort.^30 But by
31 March 1972, when Sadat declared war was inevitable and called the Americans
liars, public statements pointedly named Sidqi as chairing a cabinet session on war
preparations.^31 A week later, Sidqi declared “the day of war is close, and Eg ypt has all
the necessary weapons.”^32 He even incurred public US protest by praising the terrorist
attack at Israel’s Lod airport on 30 May.^33 None of this made Sidqi unwelcome in
Moscow, which hardly conforms with its supposed opposition to Sadat’s war plans.
Moreover, his delegation also included foreign minister and former ambassador to
the USSR Ghaleb, a longtime liaison with the Soviet leadership.^34 Ghaleb lost his
post in August, but rumors that Sidqi himself would also be ousted never material-
ized, so that his mission was hardly considered a failure; he served until March 1973,
when Sadat himself took over the premiership.^35 Upon returning to Cairo at 3 a.m.
on 15 July 1972, Sidqi reported immediately to the president.^36
Sidqi’s visit has been accounted for in various and conflicting ways, depending on
whether it was assumed to have taken place just before or just after the Soviets were
informed of their purported ouster. He was initially assumed to have presented the
Soviets with a final ultimatum to supply the weaponry that Sadat had demanded; its
rejection was held to have led to the expulsion order.^37 One request attributed to
Sidqi was indeed turned down (again): a renewed demand to buy the MiG-25s.^38 But
these aircraft had never been promised to Eg ypt, much less contracted for.
A British embassy official (and MI6 operative) in Cairo, Alan Urwick, put the
arms-denial theory to Adm. Ivliev after Sadat’s announcement. As the Briton
reported on 21 July, Ivliev—“relaxed and in good humour”—confirmed Sidqi had
presented demands for weaponry “but he did not say that Sidky had delivered an
ultimatum. The impression he gave was that only after Sidky’s return to Cairo was the
instruction to leave given.” Urwick also quoted another ultimatum version, which
was picked up by his Italian colleague: that Sidqi’s visit resulted from an ultimatum
given to Sadat “in the early part of July” by “a committee of senior army officers ... to
get rid of the Soviet advisers,” and that Sadat intentionally created the appearance