THE DEAL AT THE SUMMIT AND THE “EXPULSION” MYTHthat “the Soviets were refusing ‘legitimate’ demands.”^39 The latter part of this theory
now seems to have been closest to reality, but there was clearly an effort to spread the
ultimatum version about Sidqi’s trip in various forms.
However, once the Eg yptian line was shaped whereby the decision had been made
and communicated to the Soviets on 8 July, before Sidqi even left for Moscow, other
explanations were called for. On 22 July, the day that Al-Akhbar so dated Sadat’s
move, the paper claimed that Sidqi’s mission was “a confirmation of continuing
friendship and cooperation.”^40 This was disbelieved at the time by Western diplomats
and subsequently by Western historians, who conjectured that Sidqi was “sent by
Sadat to Moscow to ... permit the Soviets some face-saving,” but “the Soviets refused
to cooperate”; the visit was “a total failure” and the joint communiqué was a “lie.”^41
However, this conclusion rested merely on the absence of “any mention of military
aid or military cooperation” in Sidqi’s farewell speech. No positive evidence was or is
offered, except for the subsequent “expulsion” itself.^42
Indeed, in Moscow, Chernyaev was instructed to round up several bigwigs and
another “200 people from the regional committee, to show enthusiasm during his
[Sidqi’s] departure.” However, “the negotiations ran behind schedule and the guest
was delayed for his flight. I allowed the people to go, because it was hot, they were
sitting for four hours without lunch, and it was Friday.” Chernyaev was anxious that
“there could be some ‘serious consequences’ for me” from this failure—which indi-
cates that no snub was intended. On the contrary, his impression was that “we gave
them quite a bit of what they were asking. A week ago [Hafez] al-Assad, the President
of Syria, was here. ... He was able to get our guys to practically approve a ‘military
solution,’ and got a great deal.”^43
The rapid succession of conflicting Eg yptian versions has been seen as a series of
inept and increasingly transparent attempts to mask a genuine rift. But it could just
as plausibly have been deliberately aimed to create the false impression of a badly
concealed rupture. The latest Russian dating of the decision at 13 July appears to
point in the latter direction, since if the Soviet withdrawal was finally determined
in Sidqi’s talks, which “focused on military and political matters” and were
“restricted to a few members on each side” including Grechko, it could hardly have
been unilateral.^44
Vinogradov himself related that Sadat “suddenly and without any provocation,
very irritably, declared to me that he was giving up altogether the service of the Soviet
military personnel.” However, the envoy never confirmed that this was on 8 July, or
indeed on any date that month. In reminiscences that were not included in his widely
published memoirs, he states that this conversation took place in June 1972.^45 This is
not the only Russian source to claim that “in June 1972 ... Sadat invited the USSR’s
Ambassador in Eg ypt and the Chief Military Adviser ... and declared that the Soviet
advisers and specialists ... were ... no longer needed, and the time had come to bid
farewell.”^46 This is echoed by Kapitanets, the deputy commander of the Mediterranean