THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–19731971, with the primary mission of training the Eg yptians. By June 1972, ten Eg yptian
crews had completed their courses, and in July “an order came to terminate the
group’s mission.” The planes were handed over, but it soon transpired that the Soviets’
repatriation was premature. “The EAF command needed the assistance of the Tu-16
experts again. In December 1972 a group of so-called ‘instructors’ from the same unit
of the Baltic fleet arrived in Eg ypt,” including missile experts. They had a six-month
contract, but “the missile men stayed ... till October 1973.”^56 There was, then, at least
some Soviet involvement when these planes would fire twenty-three Kelts at Israeli
targets in the Yom Kippur War.^57
At the EAF’s Inshas airbase, Col. Rubtsov’s ten-man instructor team continued its
activity into August; during the last two months, they were only limited to joint
flights in two-seater training craft rather than solo demonstrations. They were seen
off cordially, and Rubtsov received both Eg yptian and Soviet decorations—the latter
from Grechko in person.^58
E. From canard to “Concept”
Tawila’s stress on the aircraft aspect of the deception exercise, and Yena’s disclosure
about his mission’s continuity, are of special importance as they pertain to a central
tenet of the evolving Israeli “Concept.” It held that Eg ypt would not initiate even a
limited war for lack of fighter-bombers capable of striking at Israel’s hinterland, mainly
its airbases; and that these would not be forthcoming as a result of the supposed rift
with Moscow. This assumption rested, among other sources, on reports received from
Ashraf Marwan in 1971–2, whereby regardless of any offensive plans and exercises, the
Eg yptian military did not regard a cross-canal attack as feasible without such air capa-
bility.^59 The IDF chief of staff, Elazar, reckoned as late as 17 September 1973 that the
main reason for the improbability of war was the Arabs’ own assessment of their planes’
inability to reach IAF bases with a sufficient payload.^60
However, the new Eg yptian Sukhois’ range, from bases west of the canal, did cover
nearly all of Israel. Syria’s easily covered the rest—indeed, they were sent on such
missions in the 1973 war.^61 But although Israeli military analysts were aware of the
Sukhoi deliveries “about a year before the [Yom Kippur] war,” they did not consider
these planes equal to the task.^62 The head of MI research claimed that though the
Eg yptians once considered the Su-17 as adequate, “we concluded that when they got
to know it they would understand it wasn’t, and that’s exactly what happened.”^63 But
on the very eve of the war, MI chief Ze’ira himself voiced concern over the arrival of
an Su-20 squadron in Eg ypt, describing even this export model’s specifications as
“approaching those of the Phantom.” He estimated that the Su-20 and the “MiG-23”
were capable of attacking the IAF and thus of deterring it from resumption of its
depth bombings.^64