DECEPTION-ON-NILE, JULY 1972Still, Ze’ira considered that the Arabs were counting mainly on future supply of
Western craft. There was much debate whether Mirage V planes transferred from
Libya would fulfil this requirement—and when this would happen, the estimate
being that their numbers (five squadrons) and integration would be sufficient only in
1975–6. Justifying this assessment after the war, Ze’ira did not even mention the
Sukhois.^65 The Libyan Mirages’ transfer was negotiated by Marwan as Sadat’s envoy,
and was reported by him to the Israelis—which may explain the overrated signifi-
cance they ascribed to it.^66 In the Yom Kippur War, Libyan Mirages were sighted
bombing Israeli positions along the canal but were not used for long-range attacks.^67
Neither, for that matter, were the Eg yptian Sukhois. The “Concept” turned out to be
entirely wrong on this matter, evidently at least in part as a result of disinformation.
Like the other advisers, Yena noted an effort to minimize public awareness of their
presence. “Our multi-storey hotel in Nasser City was emptied. The Soviet headquarters
was transferred to a private villa. Now we lived in a three-floor villa not far away from
headquarters.”^68 As their posting to Eg ypt was for less than one year, Yena and his crew
were not entitled to bring their families along, so they created no oboz problem.
On 11 August 1972, as Kissinger reported, Dobrynin handed him another letter
from Brezhnev “urging a resumption of bilateral Middle East negotiations.” But this
time the Soviet ambassador “eschewed the pretense that the Soviet withdrawal rep-
resented an advance payment on the offer of last October.” Rather, Dobrynin admit-
ted that “Sadat had miscalculated. He had thought the request to leave would pro-
duce negotiations. Instead, the Soviet Union had pulled everybody out”—as
sweeping an exaggeration as Marwan’s.^69