26. The Soviets “Return” in October
Primakov at last met Israeli Atomic Energ y Commission head Freier again at a
Pugwash conference in Oxford, 7 to 12 September 1972.^1 The Soviet emissary’s
account—the only one available from this meeting—appears to reflect Israeli accep-
tance of the “expulsion” as fact. “[Freier] stressed the Israeli assessment that the depar-
ture of Soviet personnel from Eg ypt should impact positively on mutual relations,”
and even said that Israel was planning to propose resumption of diplomatic relations.
It was Primakov who downplayed the withdrawal’s significance: “the USSR as before
has a strong position in Eg ypt, other Arab states and the Palestinian movement, and
Soviet policy remains a central factor.” He warned against “using contact with us to
press the United States, which is flirting with Eg ypt, to complicate Soviet–Arab
relations.” Primakov’s report claimed that Freier agreed; it was relayed by Andropov
to the Central Committee, where it was endorsed by head of state Podgorny, Premier
Kosygin and the Party’s ideologue Mikhail Suslov. But no further action was taken.^2
In February 1973, Brezhnev told the Politburo that “Andropov and Gromyko are
assigned to look for new ways to establish contact with Israel,” but acknowledged that
“past attempts were unsuccessful.”^3
The Israelis evidently felt no urgency. They took Primakov’s remarks as putting the
best face on a Soviet setback, and the developing “Concept” was not affected; if at all,
it was reinforced. On 20 January 1973, the semiannual estimate from IDF intelli-
gence held that the prospect of an Eg yptian cross-canal offensive was “more remote
than ever.” The main reason given was that Eg ypt had been weakened by the expul-
sion of the Soviet SAM division.^4
The day after the Pugwash conference ended—13 September—Kissinger was back
in Moscow to prepare a visit by Brezhnev to the United States, in effect another
summit. The Middle East was broached by the Soviet leader as the last item in their
discussion: the transcript shows little rancor on either side. Kissinger, far from his
charges of “chutzpah,” now appeared to believe that he had engineered a Soviet–
Eg yptian rift as a Soviet concession in return for the benefits of détente, and compli-