THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973mented Brezhnev for it. The general secretary made no attempt to correct him, and
even appears to have uttered some expletive about the Eg yptians:
Dr Kissinger: ... Some of the charges made by the Eg yptian leaders against you reflect the
serious and responsible role you have played. ... [It] puts on us a certain responsibility to
deal towards you in the same spirit.
... Mr Brezhnev: That is ... a logical and absolutely correct analysis.
... Dr Kissinger: That does not mean that the people we are dealing with are always logical.
(Brezhnev makes off-record remark.) ... this area is a good test of our relations. ... We will
take no major initiative in this area except in full consultation and discussion with you.They agreed that the situation was actually worsening and blamed the regional
actors, but saw little urgency in acting on it before the US election—a marked change
from Brezhnev’s message two months earlier.^5 This appeared to bear out a CIA analy-
sis presented the same day, which connected the expulsion with a weakening of
Brezhnev’s domestic standing and predicted he would respond “in a measured man-
ner”: “The crucial questions are ... how Brezhnev will react if he feels his own position
is threatened. ... We expect the Soviet leaders to fight to limit their losses, to attempt
to consolidate and play up their ‘victories’ and to avoid the dramatic.”^6
A major setback dealt to the USSR by its “ouster from Eg ypt” was thus accepted as
fact by Western intelligence professionals, as well as possibly biased political players.
Field reports whereby Soviet advisers had actually remained in Eg ypt tended to
minimize both their numbers and significance. A British assessment “as of 0600
hours, Thursday 5 October” states that “only about 1,000 [Soviet military personnel]
are left ... mainly technicians and military advisers.”^7 This British document quotes
an unaccountably high figure of 20,000 Soviet servicemen in Eg ypt “as at 29 July.”
Marwan’s claim that all were gone a week earlier had apparently been dismissed by
now; the remaining number appeared small by comparison. But given the previous
total for Soviet advisers, as distinct from troops, even if this estimate had been accu-
rate it was quite significant—and definitely should not have corroborated the Soviets’
sweeping expulsion. As Asher quotes exactly the same figure for the remaining Soviet
advisers, it appears to have been accepted by the IDF as well.^8
These observations of an unbroken Soviet presence have now been amplified by
the Soviets’ own accounts, but both at the time and in subsequent historiography
they were belittled if not ignored. When the evacuation of Soviet advisers’ depen-
dents in October 1973 demonstrated the advisers’ own continued presence, a wide-
spread version developed that it had been reestablished, after a complete or near-
complete break. Herzog’s widely acclaimed 1975 history of the Yom Kippur War first
describes Sadat’s “decision to ask the Soviet Government to remove its forces and
advisers,” then asserts a Soviet–Eg yptian agreement in October to “arrest the process
of deterioration in the relationship.” Herzog goes on to claim that “soon after, Soviet