THE SOVIETS “RETURN” IN OCTOBERmilitary officers returned to Eg ypt,” but admits that “these were in addition to those
advisers and instructors who had remained after July 1972.”^9 Even if accepted as valid,
this gloss would drastically reduce the significance of the original “expulsion”; but the
actual activities of the advisers show that there was no need for such a reversal.
The supposed restationing of Soviet advisers and other personnel was accounted
for by hypothesizing that the expulsion forced Moscow to accept Sadat’s demands for
weaponry in order to maintain a vestige of influence. Conversely, it has been sug-
gested that the weakness and political unrest exposed in the Eg yptian military by the
expulsion compelled Sadat to scale down his war plans in order to regain Soviet
support. Asher puts the finalization of this supposed change in October 1972. The
official Eg yptian military history of the war puts the decision to undertake a “military
effort at a higher level than a renewed war of attrition” in concert with Syria at “the
end of 1972.”^10 This was exactly when both Eg yptians and Soviets began to plant a
second round of press reports about a Soviet return, which once denied would rein-
force the overall illusion of an irrevocable rift.
The Middle East was again the last item discussed by Foreign Minister Gromyko
and Kissinger when they met in Washington on 2 October. They did little but restate
their previous positions (the Soviet insisting again on a comprehensive settlement
including all the Israeli-occupied territories and the Palestinian refugees):
Gromyko: What should I report to the General-Secretary on your views?
... Dr Kissinger: On some of the proposals you have suggested, we disagree. On others we
agree; on others we should discuss.
FM Gromyko: When?
Dr Kissinger: Early November, after the election. ...
Amb. Dobrynin: You will need one week after the election for celebration!^11But as they spoke, a rapid succession of indications strengthened the impression
that the Soviets were taking advantage of the interim to regain the standing they had
supposedly lost in Eg ypt.
On 3 October, Vinogradov returned to Cairo, which he had left shortly after the
“expulsion” order for a longer absence than the usual summer vacation.^12 After a call
in Moscow by Eg ypt’s information minister, it was reported that a “reconciliation”
visit there by Prime Minister Sidqi had been arranged by Syrian President Assad.
Heikal (who had been rebuffed by Kissinger when he asked to meet in Europe) called
for a rapprochement with the USSR, because “even if the Soviets give us 50 percent
of what we asked for,” that would be more than the Europeans and Americans would
provide. Sadat himself reiterated that the main dispute with Moscow was over the
“means to strike at the Israeli hinterland.”^13 Following an Israeli raid in Lebanon,
Sadat claimed that “if I had had ‘MiG-23s’ ... I would have attacked Israel”; Sidqi was