THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973There is no indication that Kissinger sensed Brezhnev’s sarcasm or the significance
of his allusion to two Ismails, one of whom (Ahmed, Eg yptian Chief of Staff ) elabo-
rated war plans and procurement in Moscow while the other (Hafez, Sadat’s envoy)
floated a peace initiative in Washington. Even recent American and Israeli studies still
took the statements at face value: Brezhnev, fearful that the Eg yptian–Syrian deter-
mination to fight would wreck détente, was sincerely urging the Americans to secure
a settlement. Kissinger, confident in US intelligence assessments that any Arab offen-
sive would fail, resisted any pressure for concessions.^20
On 20 May, Hafez Ismail again met Kissinger, who had obtained Nixon’s approval
first and foremost to prevent war before the summit, and to “buy ourselves a year.”^21
It was, then, hardly a disappointment when after the talk Kissinger concluded: “in
short, Ismail came to this meeting to probe White House intentions further—not to
discuss concrete elements of a possible Eg ypt–Israel agreement.”^22 In his memoirs,
Kissinger was harder on Ismail: “he ... said he would check with Sadat and let me
know. I never heard from him. ... Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. ...
We did not know it.”^23
When this was published (1982), accusations were already rife that Kissinger him-
self had been party to a conspiracy to enable a “small victory” for Sadat, and the
memoir appears to reflect his effort to refute the allegations. But unlike his perfor-
mance in respect of the “expulsion” a year before, documentation that has since
emerged does not entirely contradict his claim. Eban recalled after the war an
“explicit” assessment by the State Department’s Middle East specialists in May ’73
that Sadat was not about to launch a war at all, as his chances were better on the
political front. In particular, he could achieve more, after a rapprochement with the
Saudis, by utilizing the oil weapon—but not against the United States. Another
“agency” predicted war within one to one and a half months, others disagreed. “The
President and Secretary of State adopted the more reassuring version.”^24 Publicly at
the time, Eban appeared to take the same position when he told the Knesset on
28 May “in the defense arena we must prepare ... but also not ignore the possibility
that this is just an international intimidation campaign.”^25
By then, on 17–23 May—according to the recently published Syrian docu-
ments—Eg yptian and Syrian Air Force commanders had met in Cairo to assign
targets and timing for a coordinated offensive. The joint command asked the
Syrians to present their detailed plan at another meeting in Cairo on 6 July—that
is, after the summit.^26
Returning to Israel on 15 June, just before the summit, the KGB-linked Soviet
journalist Victor Louis gave Gazit the same warning that Brezhnev had given
Kissinger: the USSR would willy-nilly have to support an Eg yptian attack when it
came, even though Moscow estimated it had little chance: “VL: The Russian military
information is that you would win this war. ... Unfortunately Russia still sticks to the