THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in return not for peace but an end to the state
of belligerency. Final peace would depend on subsequent negotiations with the
Palestinians. ... Brezhnev must have understood—and if he did not, Gromyko was much
too experienced not to know—that there was no chance whatever ... of reaching any such
agreement in the remaining few hours.The record indeed shows Brezhnev threatening the entirety of détente: “I am cate-
gorically opposed to a resumption of the war. But without agreed principles ... we
cannot do this.”^31 Nixon proudly related displaying “firmness”: “I pointed out that there
was no way I could agree to any such ‘principles’ without prejudicing Israel’s rights.”
A few hours later, the communiqué “emphasized areas of agreement while glossing
over differences in such areas as achieving a Middle East settlement.”^32 On this issue,
it said only that “each side set forth” its views.^33 To reporters covering the conference,
this topic was listed above “European security matters” as “the most difficult” in the
talks.^34 As Chazov felt in the Soviet entourage, Brezhnev “returned as a victor.”
Unlike the Moscow summit, there could be no claim that he had let Eg ypt down,
and by setting demands that the Americans and Israelis clearly would not meet he had
supplied the legitimacy for war. Nixon wrote in hindsight: “whether he already had
a commitment to the Arabs to support an attack against Israel is not clear.” The
United States could not take credit for foreseeing, let alone preventing, the Soviet-
supported offensive in the first place. But as consolation, Nixon claimed: “I am con-
fident that the firmness I showed that night reinforced the seriousness of the message
I conveyed to the Soviets when I ordered a military alert four months later during the
Yom Kippur War.”^35
As after the Moscow summit, after San Clemente too the prevailing interpretation,
as stated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was that Sadat had hoped for a settlement
but was again disillusioned. Now, however, he blamed mainly the United States
rather than the Soviet Union, and after a nonaligned initiative “to distort the correct
meaning of Resolution 242” (as the Israelis called it) was foiled by a US veto on
26 July, he bitterly and publicly attacked the Americans.^36
C. The final precondition: the Scuds arrive
In “early July,” data was again received in Israel about intensive Syrian–Eg yptian
coordination to resume hostilities.^37 This may reflect some information about a
Syrian–Eg yptian consultation in Cairo—the one originally scheduled for 6 July. It
took place “from 3 to 5 July,” and the main issue was now the zero hour for the joint
offensive, which had been a matter of some contention as the Eg yptians would be
attacking eastward, the Syrians westward, and both preferred to have the sun in the
enemy’s eyes. It was now set for midday, in order “to achieve the first targets by dark.”
The preceding air and artillery strikes were timed accordingly, and on 1–2 August