The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

NOTES

pp. [15–18]^

voyny i diplomatii 1941 god, Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001, Chapter 8, http://www.pseu-

dolog y.org/Abel/Sudoplatov1941/index.htm

84. Richard Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana
    University Press, 1993, p. 21. The former ambassador was in fact alive enough to be inter-
    viewed by Ginor a year later, from his Moscow home. Ha’aretz, 5 July 1991.


85. Kimche, Last Option, pp. 16–17.


86. Egorin, Egipet, p. 114.


87. Yossef Govrin, Israeli embassy, Buenos Aires (formerly in Moscow) to East European
    Department, Foreign Ministry, 4 September 1967. ISA, HZ-4048/18. In France,
    Vinogradov for years cultivated the retired Charles de Gaulle, thus gaining unequalled
    access in Paris (and standing in Moscow) when the general returned to power (Boris
    Kudaev, Perevodchiki, now inaccessible; the book text is accessible at http://www.e-read-
    ing-lib.com/chapter.php/1001592/0/Kudaev_-_Pule_perevodchik_ne_nuzhen.html).
    Vinogradov likewise foresaw the rise of Nasser’s underling Sadat when no one else con-
    sidered the latter a likely successor (Akopov, transcript, p. 19).


88. “Polish Record,” in Hershberg, Aftermath, p. 11.


89. Andropov and Gromyko to CPSU Central Committee, 10 June 1968. Boris Morozov
    (ed.), Evreyskaya emigratsiya v svete novykh dokumentov, Tel Aviv University: Cummings
    Center, 1998, p. 62; Committee resolution, ibid., p. 63.


90. CIA Intelligence Information Cable 65699, 6 October 1967; CIA Office of National
    Estimates Special Memorandum 10–67, 21 November 1967, CIA FOIA website, https://
    http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000109059.pdf.


91. HOLDING THE LINE ON THE SUEZ CANAL
    
    
    1. Korn, Stalemate, pp. 54–5.
    
    
    2. Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. 2, document no. 275, pp. 597–8.
    
    
    3. A Mirage-III shot down at night over Sinai on 8 June. List of IAF air crew killed in action,
       http://www.sky-high.co.il/image/users/134771/ftp/my_files/KIA/KIA%20date.
       pdf ?id=3269650
    
    
    4. Korn’s erroneous statement (Stalemate, p. 167) that in 1967 “Israel’s air victory was so
       quick and so complete that no surface-to-air missiles were fired” may reflect Heikal’s ear-
       lier, unfounded claim that “in the surprise of the Israeli air-strike they [the SAM-2s] were
       never fired” (Road to Ramadan, pp. 79–80).
    
    
    5. “What Happened to Eg ypt’s Rockets?,” Canadian Jewish Chronicle Review (16 June 1967),
       p. 14; Danny Shalom, Like a Bolt Out of the Blue: “Moked” Operation in the Six-Day War,
       June 1967, Rishon le-Zion (Israel): Bavir, 2002, pp. 215–18.
    
    
    6. Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. 2, document no. 275, pp. 597–8.
    
    
    7. “Polish Record,” in Hershberg, Aftermath, pp. 9, 16.
    
    
    8. Ford, “Growth of the Soviet Commitment,” p. 118.
    
    
    9. Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. 2, document no. 275, pp. 597–8.
    
    
    
    


92. Vadim A. Kirpichenko, Iz arkhiva razvedchika, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya,
    1993, pp. 94–5.