The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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NOTES


pp. [84–86]^



  1. Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition, pp. 43–4.

  2. Dmitri Makarov, “Rezident GRU vspominaet: Pozvol’te mne vas zaverbovat’,” Argumenty
    i Fa kt y (Moscow), International Edition, 7 June 2000, p. 16.

  3. Zhirokhov and Nichol, “Unknown Heroes,” part 2. The IAF has confirmed putting its
    first reconnaissance UAVs into service only in early 1972, and their first combat use in the
    1973 war; IAF website, http://www.iaf.org.il/4968-33518-HE/IAF.aspx. As Tsoy’s
    account is dated before the ceasefire of August 1970, the “enemy” drone might have been
    American.

  4. Telephone interview with Valery Yaremenko (Moscow), 21 January 2001. Yaremenko was
    a Middle East specialist at the Russian Defense Ministry’s Institute of Military History.
    As a military interpreter attached to a SAM unit, he witnessed the Israeli attack on Iraq’s
    nuclear reactor in 1981.

  5. The source, Nurtay Kniazov, is described and pictured as an anti-aircraft gunner, who
    would hardly qualify for such missions, and other features of his account are clearly imag-
    inary. Moiseenkov, “Soldat iz Kazakhstana.”

  6. US officials were deliberating at this time whether to press Israel on its plans to acquire
    “medium and short-range surface-to-surface missiles,” but this referred to such nuclear-
    capable weapons as the French MD-660, which had been contracted for before 1967.
    Battle, “Israel and the MD-620 Missile,” 20 June 1968, FRUS J-XX, no. 196. There is no
    indication that the United States was aware of the Israeli rocketing on the canal until Eg ypt
    publicized it.

  7. Michalson, Abirei lev, p. 23.

  8. He came very close: the scant information released later in Israel puts the Z e’ev’s payload
    at 70 kilograms and its range at 4.5 kilometers. There was a heavier variant, with a 170
    kilogram warhead that could fly for only 1 kilometer, but it is not clear whether it was
    used at this stage. Zeev Schiff and Eitan Haber (eds), Israel, Army and Defence: A Dictionary,
    Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan-Modan, 1976, p. 196. For comparison, the Soviet M-24 240mm
    Katyusha, of which several mobile multiple launchers were captured by Israel in 1967 and
    put into IDF service, carried half the payload but to more than twice the range. The M-466
    130mm cannon, the mainstay of Eg ypt’s artillery, could lob a 30 kilogram shell for over
    27 kilometers.

  9. The IDF Ground Forces website lists the Z e’ev launch that killed Riad “and several of his
    senior officers” as (still) experimental; http://mazi.idf.il/5221-6394-HE/IGF.aspx. Asher’s
    recent English version (Strateg y, p. 28) mentions “Israeli rocket fire” as killing Riad, cor-
    recting the earlier Hebrew version that credited “mortar fire” (Concept, p. 48).

  10. News agencies, Davar, 10 September 1968, p. 1. The observers heard, at night, sounds
    that they attributed to rockets.

  11. V.I. Ryabukhin, “V Egipte,” in I.V. Shishchenko and A.P. Glazkov (eds), Smolyane-
    internatsionalisty, Smolensk: Smyadyn’, 2000, pp. 177–8; Malashenko, Vspominaya, p. 293.

  12. Rusk, “Briefing on the World Situation,” 9 September 1968, in US Senate, Executive
    Sessions, pp. 1000–1.

  13. Bard, “Phantom Jets.”

  14. Arab affairs correspondent, Davar, 27 October 1968, p. 1. We found no other references

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