NOTES
pp. [217–221]^
- James Reston, NYT, “Arab President Changes Tone,” Times (Geneva, NY), 30 December
1970, p. 7. - Bergus, Cairo, to secretary of state, 8 February 1971. NARA, NSC H-files, box H-51,
folder 5. - Harold H. Saunders, memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, “Review of US–USSR Positions on
the Middle East,” 19 February 1971, NARA SRG M ME 2–25 (71 [1 of 2]), H-files, box
H-52, folder 4. - Joseph Alsop, “A Big Blink?,” Daily Times (Watertown, NY), 17 February 1971, p. 6.
- SAR, no. 125, p. 300n7, quoting Dobrynin cable to Foreign Ministry, 24 February.
- Anthony Astrakhan, Washington Post, Moscow, translated in Ma’ariv, 1 March 1971.
- AFP and AP, Ma’ariv, 8 March 1971, p. 1.
- SAR, p. 305n6.
- Kissinger, memorandum for the president, “NSC Discussion of the Middle East: February
26,” 25 February 1971, NARA NSC Meeting ME and Laos 2/26/71, box H-030, folder
3, pp. 1, 5; emphasis added. - SAR, p. 304n6. The editors interpret “end of the ceasefire” as showing that Kissinger knew
of Sadat’s decision to terminate the ceasefire a day before it was announced. This does not
conform to the other evidence cited here, including Dobrynin’s remark. - AP, Davar, 8 March 1971, p. 1. This is another rare reference to Soviet tank units in Eg ypt.
- Title of article by Yosef Harif, Ma’ariv, 8 March 1971, p. 3; exclamation point in original.
Eban, for instance, held that the threat of war was meant to make the United States press
Israel for concessions; he rejected UN Secretary-General U Thant’s description of Sadat’s
reply to Jarring as positive. - Ma’ariv, 12 March 1971, p. 1.
- The Israeli reading was that this actually reflected Sadat’s reluctance to declare war, due to
Eg ypt’s failure to mobilize an eastern front against Israel, and that it was intended to pac-
ify aggressive Eg yptian officers. Shmu’el Segev, Ma’ariv, 15 March 1971, p. 9. - For example, Le Figaro, quoted in Ma’ariv, 9 March 1971, p. 2.
- Shmu’el Segev, Ma’ariv, 7 March 1971, p. 9; this analysis commended Sadat for caution,
and predicted that he would extend the ceasefire. - By US officials; Ma’ariv, 11 April 1971, p. 1.
- Arab affairs correspondent, Davar, 3 January 1971, p. 2.
- V. Vinogradov, “K istorii Sovetsko-Egipetskikh otnosheniy,” in Meyer et al., To g d a,
pp. 18–19. Vadim A. Kirpichenko dates this meeting as 27 April 1971; Razvedka i lichnosti,
Moscow: Geya, 1998, pp. 113–17. - Komlev, “Voyna u Piramid”; Vakhtin, “Simfonicheskiy kontsert.” The Eg yptian offer of
“recreational programming” and the Soviet refusal were confirmed by “senior officers” to
Mishchenko: “some desperate characters couldn’t restrain themselves ... the next day it
would be found out by the command, and within 24 hours the culprit would be sent home
in disgrace.” Temirova and Shunevich, “Vo vremya voyny.” - Logachev, “Eto zabyt’ nevozmozhno,” pp. 156–7.
- Interviewed in Tereshchenko, “Egiptyanin.”