4
FRAMING THE CROSS-CANAL GOAL
AND THE ATTRITION STRATEGY
A. Plans and training for “crossing a water obstacle”
Traveling in January 1968 to Eg ypt, where he was impressed by chief Soviet military
adviser Petr Lashchenko as “a profound and wise strategist,” Semenov found “our advis-
ers trying to restore fighting spirit in the [Eg yptian] Army”—and this was no longer
limited to defense.^1 On the eve of Sokolov’s arrival in October, Nasser had reiterated to
Ambassador Vinogradov that Eg ypt sought a peaceful resolution but would build “a
strong offensive army capable of ousting the occupiers.”^2 On 25 November—three days
after the Security Council resolution on terms for a peace settlement—Nasser met with
his military command and called for a five-year period of concentrated war prepara-
tions. Riad followed up with instructions to draw up training plans for “an attack across
the Suez Canal and securing a bridgehead on its east bank.”^3
Despite the Soviets’ declared commitment to Resolution 242, the advisers were
soon put to work on preparing such an offensive. The makeup of the advisers’ team
was remarkably suited to the task: as Brezhnev had pointed out, “we have selected
experienced people, who have gone through the last war.”^4 The generals and senior
colonels were almost all veterans of the East European theater in the Second World
War, where the Red Army had to cross countless waterways. Lashchenko himself had
been made an HSU in 1943 for “skillful command and personal valor” while leading
a rifle division across four rivers.^5 Even though the first contingent of advisers was
later replaced by younger officers, Israeli analysts would note after the Yom Kippur
War that the Eg yptian canal-crossing operation resembled Soviet practice in the
1940s more than the revised doctrine that had been introduced in the 1960s.^6
The Eg yptians’ theoretical fervor for reversing the June defeat could be harnessed
to overcome their endemic resistance to practical change and effort. “Many Eg yptian
officers,” Maj.-Gen. Malashenko recalls,
said that Sinai must be liberated, but they were not getting ready for it and did not even
think about crossing the canal. It was recommended to begin training, assemble all crossing