THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973equipment available, repair it since most items were defective, and improvise [the rest]
with readily accessible means. ... Bridge and ferry assembly was rehearsed.Lashchenko employed another argument to enable preparation of the main offen-
sive ground force. While developing the defense plan for the Suez Canal, despite both
Eg yptian and Soviet fears that a renewed IDF offensive was imminent, Lashchenko
cogently pointed out that it could not be mounted without warning as the Israelis
had but a sparse presence on the east bank. In November 1967, he still estimated that
the IDF kept an “insignificant” force of three to four infantry brigades on the front
line, facing five Eg yptian divisions. There were two more Israeli brigades, one of them
armored, farther back behind the strategic mountain passes in Sinai, but “he argued
that the main Israeli force was 200 miles away, and would take 24 hours to approach.”
Anyway, as Lashchenko reckoned (this time mistakenly), the main IDF assault force
would be airborne, and so would bypass the Eg yptians’ forward defenses. He there-
fore suggested pulling two of the Eg yptian divisions, in rotation, back from their
static and indolent front line positions for intensive training in the rear.^7
It took some time to move the Eg yptians from rhetoric to practice. In mid-January
1968, Karpov wrote, “Lashchenko came in the morning with the II Army Corps
commander, General [Ahmed] Ismail ... he conversed with the division commander
about crossing the canal, digging in on the bridgehead ... etc.”
Then the advisers took part in a staff seminar on “an offensive operation to include
crossing of the Suez Canal.” The discussion went on till 3:00 a.m. “It was stormy ...
[General Abdel Halim] Abu Ghazala raised the question of fire cover for the crossing.
His speech was followed by much argument, until the floor was taken by the senior
adviser of the 2nd Division,” Col. Afanas’ev.
Afanas’ev’s authority on overcoming water obstacles could hardly be questioned:
his citation as HSU was for leading, as a lieutenant in 1943, a company across the
Dnieper under heavy enemy fire “with the means at his disposal” (makeshift rafts and
requisitioned boats). His force secured a beachhead, held it against two enemy coun-
terattacks, and thus ensured a successful crossing for the entire division. When
ammunition ran out, they fought off a third attack with bayonets and bare hands.
Afanas’ev personally killed nineteen “Fritzies” and was one of seven Soviet soldiers
who survived out of over 120. Now, in Eg ypt, he coolly “answered questions and
calmed everyone down.”^8
B. The need for more advisers despite a shortage of Soviet officers
Lashchenko was concerned that the agreed number and assignments of Soviet advis-
ers would not suffice to bring Eg yptian servicemen up to the standards that Afanas’ev
personified. In the same meeting in January 1968, he asked the advisers’ opinion
about sending in more of their colleagues, to be attached permanently to individual
battalions instead of visiting them periodically from brigade headquarters. “The