FRAMING THE CROSS-CANAL GOALwater sabotage. The explosion of such a grenade could split a frogman’s eardrums at
200 meters.” Kharchikov’s memoir also alludes cryptically to a major naval incident
the same month: “... during this tour of duty, northeast of Crete ... the eskadra con-
ducted training exercises with depth charges. In this region, an Israeli submarine that
became too curious vanished without a trace ...” This passage begins and ends with
ellipses, clearly hinting that all is not being said.^13
The time and—as is now known—the location match the disappearance of the
Israeli submarine Dakar while on its maiden voyage to Haifa after being bought and
refitted in Britain. For years, searches focused north of the Eg yptian coast (because
the submarine’s emergency buoy had washed ashore near Gaza). Only at the end of
May 1999 was the Dakar’s wreckage indeed found on the seabed south of the midway
point between Crete and Cyprus. Its conning tower was sheared off and lay 200
meters away from the rest. This suggested that the submarine, rather than being sunk
by a depth charge or torpedo, may have collided with (or was rammed by) another
vessel as it moved submerged at “snorkel depth” of less than 50 feet. The Israeli Navy
has stated, however, that no evidence was found on the wreckage, including the part
of the tower that was raised, to prove either a hostile attack or an accidental collision.
To date, no definitive account has been offered. An unspecified “sudden event”
remains the Israel Navy’s preferred version, with one possibility being loss of control
during an emergency dive to avoid a collision, after sighting a surface ship at very close
range on a stormy night.^14
Could this ship have been Soviet? The Dakar’s remains were located before
Kharchikov’s memoir was published, and he may have made the connection after
reading about it—but his was not the only such veiled reference to some Soviet con-
nection. Among others, just before the wreck’s discovery was announced the present
authors were offered, for sale, the logbook of a Soviet ship that was supposedly
involved. Specifically, the source referred to the Kashin-class BPK (large anti-subma-
rine ship) Soobrazitel’nyy, which was indeed spotted in the Mediterranean at the time
and mentioned in the Eg yptian press.^15 The deal did not go through, and we pub-
lished nothing about the Dakar’s fate, but shortly afterward a Russian diplomat in Tel
Aviv who was evidently aware of our confidential contacts startled us with an unso-
licited statement that “we did not sink the submarine.”
A first factual clue of hostile involvement in the Dakar sinking emerged in March
2013, when the Israel State Archive declassified a batch of documents (which again
indicated that not all information on the incident has been released). It included the
transcript of a cabinet meeting on 28 January 1968, in which Navy chief Shlomo Erell
reported about the search effort: twelve hours after it began, a signal was received
starting with the Dakar’s identification mark. The routine Q&A’s were exchanged in
the international maritime code, but contact was broken off at the point when they
were supposed to switch to the Israeli code (and presumably to Hebrew). The Israelis’
suspicions grew when the same pattern was repeated some twenty-seven hours later.