THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Swedish ambassador in Moscow, and did little if anything to enable its success.^10 The
CIA more realistically estimated that the Eg yptians’ “extreme pessimism” on this
count led to determination on their part to launch the attack soon, with differences
between Nasser and Defense Minister Muhammad Fawzy only about the date—the
emotionally charged anniversary of 5 June or as early as “late March or early April.”^11
The Egyptians kept pressing to prepare a canal crossing sooner rather than later. In
early March 1968, Riad invited Malashenko to attend a secret exercise of an infantry
brigade and ranger detachment commanded by General Saad-el-Din Shazly, then chief
of paratroops and special forces, which included a parachute and helicopter drop.
Nasser was present and asked Malashenko: “Is it very complicated to ford the Suez
Canal? Can Eg yptian forces do it?” The Soviet officer gave the good news first: “a cross-
ing is very complicated, but with meticulous preparation, artillery and air cover and a
reliable defense against air attack, Eg yptian forces will be able to do it. However, they
lack combat experience as well as the requisite morale and fighting qualities.”
Malashenko reported this exchange to Lashchenko, who met Nasser to discuss the
issue. “After this, recommendations were formulated to prepare forces for attack
across a water obstacle. This formed the basis for training at various levels,” and
Malashenko maintains that “combat operations of the UAR [Eg yptian] armed forces
in 1973 began roughly according to this plan.”
Testifying before the Agranat Commission in December 1973, the head of
research at Israeli Military Intelligence (MI) admitted that as late as 14 August 1968,
an MI report still held “that the Eg yptians had not at that time begun to tackle the
problem” of a canal crossing. But he took credit for this paper’s accurate prediction
of the eventual attack’s form.^12
C. Soviet naval presence: shielding Port Said and the Dakar sinking
The destroyer crewman Kharchikov was again posted to Port Said on his second
Mediterranean tour in January 1968:
To our left was the pedestal of the monument to [Mr] Suez, the principal builder of the
canal [sic], next to it the burnt-out US consulate, then the Palace Hotel casino, which was
still operating night and day ... Port Fuad was in full view. Just beyond Fuad, 7km from our
anchorage, [were] the Israeli positions, [where dug-in T-54 tanks taken from Eg ypt in the
war] occasionally fired at the Arabs. The Soviet ships took no part in these skirmishes.
Their task [was] to begin combat operations in case of a Jewish landing on the western
bank of the Suez Canal, and to destroy it. The enemy knew... what they would risk, and
therefore they did not venture into Port Said or even Port Fuad.The Soviets took strict precautions, which indicates that they did not impute
offensive intentions to the Israelis for propaganda purposes alone: “from sunrise to
sunset, every 15 minutes, each military vessel would drop grenades to prevent under-