nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47Grodekov to recall Stoletov, disowned the Kabul mission and withdrew
any offers of assistance or treaty made to the Amir. By the time Stoletov
heard this news his mission was anyway redundant, as the Congress of
Berlin had put pressure on Russia to withdraw its forces back beyond the
Danube and a war between Russia and the other Great Powers was averted.
Despite the threat of war in Europe having receded, as far as Afghanistan
was concerned the damage could not be undone. Lytton exploited Stoletov’s
mission and the alleged secret treaty with Russia as conclusive proof of
the Amir’s political infidelity. Before Stoletov arrived in Kabul, Lytton had
written to Salisbury stating that the Amir had ‘irrevocably slipped out of
our hands’ and was already discussing the partition or dismemberment of
Afghanistan, even though only a few months earlier he had assured Sher
‘Ali Khan that Britain would respect Afghanistan’s independence. Lytton
then ordered General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain to prepare to travel
to Kabul to discuss the crisis and wrote to the Amir informing him that
a British envoy was on his way to the Afghan capital, with or without the
Amir’s consent.
Tragically, the very day the Viceroy’s letter reached the Afghan Foreign
Ministry, ‘Abd Allah Jan, the heir apparent, died and the Amir and his court
went into deep mourning. As the funeral rites were in full swing and with
memories of Amir Sher ‘Ali Khan’s slide into mental instability following
the death of his other son still fresh, no official was prepared to risk their
neck by showing the grief-stricken Amir the Viceroy’s dispatch. Eventually,
the Amir’s chamberlain took his life in his hands and showed him Lord
Lytton’s letter. A few days later Stoletov set out to return to Samarkand,
leaving two junior officers behind in Kabul.
It was almost a week before British officials heard of ‘Abd Allah Jan’s
death, but despite this news Lytton insisted Chamberlain continue his
mission to Kabul. On 30 August 1878 Lytton informed the Amir in his offi-
cial letter of condolence that Chamberlain planned to leave Peshawar for
Kabul on 16 or 17 September. When the courier reached Jalalabad, however,
he was handed a note from the Amir informing him he was ‘unfit to attend
to business’ and that ‘the matter must be deferred until after Ramazan’. 49
The last day of Ramazan fell on 27 September and in the circumstances
this was a reasonable request for postponement, but Cavagnari ordered
the messenger to continue on to Kabul in defiance of the Amir, and Sher
‘Ali Khan had little option but to allow him to proceed.
News of the impending arrival of a British mission led to a heated
debate among the Amir’s senior advisers who were unable to reach any
consensus on whether to allow Chamberlain to proceed. On 16 September