Afghanistan. A History from 1260 to the Present - Jonathan L. Lee (2018)

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afghanistan

the commander of the Afghan border post at ‘Ali Masjid wrote to Cavagnari
informing him that, since he had received no instructions from the Amir
regarding permitting the mission to enter Afghanistan, any attempt by
British officials to cross the frontier would be resisted by force of arms.
Cavagnari ignored the warning and he and Chamberlain set off up the
Khyber Pass accompanied by a large armed guard, only to be turned back
at the frontier. When Cavagnari informed Lytton of the Amir’s message
and the mission having been prevented from crossing into Afghanistan, the
Viceroy telegraphed London claiming the denial of entry was an ‘affront’
and ‘insult’ to British prestige and recommended the government declare
war on Afghanistan immediately. In anticipation of military action, Lytton
ordered troops to the Quetta and Peshawar frontiers.
Disraeli’s cabinet, however, was divided about going to war and even
Salisbury feared that an invasion might be counterproductive, since it
would provide Russia with the excuse it sought to abrogate the terms of the
Congress of Berlin. The cabinet decided instead to give the Amir one last
chance and on 2 November 1878 Lytton wrote to Sher ‘Ali Khan, inform-
ing him that war was imminent and listing the various ‘hostile acts’ he
was alleged to have committed. The Viceroy then presented him with an
ultimatum. If he wished to avoid war, the Amir must send a ‘full and suit-
able apology’ for refusing entry to the Chamberlain Mission ‘tendered
on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank’, and agree to the pres-
ence of a permanent British envoy in Afghanistan. The deadline of 20
November was set for the Amir to comply after which, Lytton declared, ‘I
shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you
as a declared enemy of the British Government’. 50 The deadline passed
without any reply. So on the following day three British columns marched
into Afghan territory.
In fact, the Amir had replied to the Viceroy’s ultimatum a day before the
deadline, but the letter failed to reach Peshawar in time. The courier, having
heard rumours that British forces had occupied ‘Ali Masjid, turned back
to Kabul to seek new instructions from the Amir. The Amir was extremely
angry with him and ordered the postmaster in Jalalabad to ensure the letter
reached Cavagnari, but it did not reach the Commissioner’s desk until 30
November, ten days after the Viceroy’s ultimatum had expired. By this
time British forces had already occupied parts of southern Afghanistan
and Cavagnari anyway dismissed the Amir’s response as inadequate,
even though Sher ‘Ali Khan had made two major concessions to British
demands. He was now prepared to allow Chamberlain to travel to Kabul
and consider the stationing of a permanent British official in his country.

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