nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47As far as Lytton was concerned this was too little too late, nor was it the
‘clear and unequivocal submission’ that Britain had demanded.
As British forces marched into southern Afghanistan, Sher ‘Ali Khan
decided not to oppose them and withdrew most of his troops from
Kandahar and Jalalabad to Herat and Kabul. Encouraged by the promises
made by Stoletov, Sher ‘Ali decided to travel to St Petersburg and appeal in
person to the Tsar for military assistance. To this end he released Ya‘qub
Khan, appointed him governor of Kabul and at the end of December 1878
the Amir set out for Mazar-i Sharif, taking with him his family and the
remaining members of the Russian Mission.
Claims by imperial historians that the Amir fled in panic, or that he
abdicated in favour of Ya‘qub Khan or appointed him as heir apparent,
however, are incorrect. Afghan histories make it clear that Sher ‘Ali Khan
remained as Amir and that his departure for Mazar was both deliberate and
strategic. 51 However negative this decision may appear in hindsight, Sher
‘Ali Khan’s plan had a rationale. His army was no match for the British and
his only hope was to draw the enemy deeper into Afghanistan, overstretch
their supply line, and hope that the tribes would rise and make it impos-
sible for Britain to occupy southern Afghanistan for any length of time.
No doubt these tactics drew on his father’s and Akbar Khan’s experience
in the First Afghan War, when the tribes’ hit-and-run tactics had worn
down the invader and eventually forced them to quit the country. As for
Mazar-i Sharif, this was an ideal safe haven, for with winter already set in
Sher ‘Ali Khan gambled that that the invaders would not be able to cross
the snowbound Hindu Kush until the spring. Furthermore, there were
15,000 government soldiers stationed in various locations in the province
and the Amir planned to use the winter to raise more levies. Mazar-i Sharif
was also close to the Russian frontier, which would make it easy for the
anticipated gift of Russian arms to reach him. It was only after he reached
Mazar-i Sharif that the Amir’s strategy unravelled.
Before leaving the Afghan capital, Sher ‘Ali Khan released all the
surviving Uzbek amirs of the Chahar Wilayat whom he had imprisoned.
On his arrival in Mazar-i Sharif, they went to the shrine of Shah-i Mardan,
where the Amir pledged to restore them to their fiefdoms on condition
they raised levies for the forthcoming war and guaranteed safe conduct
for government troops to return to Takhtapul or Herat. Most of these indi-
genous rulers had been in jail for more than a decade, the result of the Amir
breaking a similar oath. They had not only lost all faith in his promises, they
saw the British invasion as an opportunity to reassert their independence.
So when Muhammad Khan, the ex-beglar begi of Sar-i Pul, and Husain