countrycanentertainmultipleconflictingoroverlappingstrategiccultures,with
rivalinterpretationsofpastexperience.”¹¹
WithGermanaidtheChileanofficer’scorpsbecamemoreprofessionaland
Prussianorganizationalstandardswereintroduced.Furthermore,Chileanoffi-
cersthathadbeentrainedfor 2 – 3yearsinGermanytookuphighpositions
after1918.TheyformedthebasisforcontinuinginterestinGermaninstructors
inordertolearnfromtheGermanwarexperience.ButjustlikeinthecaseofTur-
keythereexistednationalconcepts,suchastheideaofthe‘bornsoldierʼwhose
furtherdevelopmentwasfosteredbygeneralconscription.Furthermore,Chile
likeRepublicanTurkey,asagrarianstates,usedtheirarmedforcesforeducation-
alanddiscipliningpurposes.Beyondpracticalmeasures,includingthealpha-
betizationandpersonalhygiene,theruralmalepopulationwasindoctrinated
inordertoaccepttheruleofthenationstate.InAnatoliaandmostcountries
ofLatinAmerica,themilitaryoftenservedasaninternalpolicingforce,sup-
pressinganyrevoltagainststateauthority.¹²OneGermanofficerevenserved
inbothcountries.HansvonKieslingaufKieslingstein’scontractwiththeChilean
armywasannulledautomaticallywithGermany’sentryintothewar.Kiesling
wasthenpostedintheOttomanarmyin1 915 ,whereheremaineduntilthearmi-
sticein1918.HetookprideinhistimeinChile,claimingafterthewarthathe
hadmanagedtoavoidthat“ChilejoinedGermany’senemies.”¹³Kieslingsevalu-
ationsalsosupporttheideathattheGermaninterestsinLatinAmericaandthe
OttomanEmpireweresimilar:tocreateapoliticalinfluence,sincethemilitary
wasapoliticalforcealongwithtappingintothemarketforthegoodofthe
ownarmamentindustry.Andnotleast,theGermanofficersgottheopportunity
tobroadentheirhorizonthroughforeignexperience.WithregardtotheOttoman
casethereisalsothequestionofhowfartransfersofGermanmilitarypractices
contributedtothegrowthofthelocalmilitarismafter1908.Itwillbeshownin
thefollowingparagraphthatthiswasnotcompletelythecase,sincetheOtto-
mansideappropriatedmainlypreselectedfeaturesoftheGermanmilitarysys-
tem.Amongthemostimportantsourcesforthosetransfersarethereportsof
theGermanmilitaryattachéStrempel.ThisimportantfigureintheGerman-Otto-
manmilitaryrelationswillbeanalyzedindetail.
PatrickPorter,MilitaryOrientalism:EasternWarthroughWesternEyes(NewYork:Columbia
UniversityPress, 20 09), 74.
Rinke,“EinePickelhaubemachtnochkeinenPreußen,” 269 – 27 4.
BayHStAIVOP 11664 ,n.p.WhileservinginGoltz’staffin 1915 /16,Kieslingalsoexchanged
comparativethoughtsontheworkoftheGermanreformersintheOttoman,ChileanandJapa-
nesearmieswiththeoldFieldMarshal.SeeHansvonKiesling,SoldatindreiWeltteilen(Leipzig:
Grethlein, 19 35), 42 8.
30 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer