vonderGoltzarguedthatmostoftheinternalandinsomecasesalsopublicdis-
courseconveyedawrongpictureofthisconflict.ForGoltz,theconsiderationsof
thoseofficerswerenottransferabletotheconditionsofwarfareinCentralEu-
rope.¹⁵⁸Nonetheless,aninternalmilitaryreportaboutthecavalryhadanimpact
onthefuturemakeupoftheGermanmountedtroops.TheBalkanWarshadco-
incidedwiththedomesticpoliticaldebateregardinganincreaseoftheGerman
army’sactivesize.Membersofparliamentactivelyfollowedthepublicationsof
theGerman participants.ColonelDietrichVeithadservedas aninstructor
withtheIstanbulcavalrymodelregiment.AfterhisparticipationintheBalkan
Wars,Veitpublishedseveralarticlesbasedonhisinternalmemorandum.¹⁵⁹
MostofhisconsiderationsastotheuseofthesmallerAnatolianhorsewithin
theGermancavalrywerenotapplicable.Buthispleaforanexpansionoftheac-
tivecavalryregimentsfoundanattentiveearamongthedeputies.TheNational
Liberalandreserveofficer,ErnstBassermann,referredtoVeit’snewspaperarti-
clestounderlinetheneedforatleastthreemorecavalryregiments.Veithadar-
guedthattheinadequatesizeoftheBulgariancavalryhadpreventedachase
andencirclementofthewithdrawingOttomantroops.TherebytheOttoman
armyhadbeenabletoassembleandregroupinthedefensiveÇatalcaposition,
whichhadfinallydecidedthewar.Bassermannconcluded:
“[T]heevaluationsofamanwhocommandedacavalrycorpsontheTurkishsideinadis-
tinguishedpositioninthelastwarareremarkableand,withotherarguments,supportthe
casethatitisrighttoprovidethe[fundingforthe]threecavalryregiments,whichhadbeen
cancelledearlier.”¹⁶⁰ThemajorityinparliamentfollowedBassermann’spleainthefollowingsession.
Veit’sconclusionshadadirecteffectontheGermanarmamentdebate.However,
thecampaigninFranceoneyearlaterprovedthattheageofthecavalryhad
cometoanend.Insteadofthreeregiments,theGermanarmywouldhavere-
quiredatleastthreecavalrydivisionsinordertodecidethewaratthisearly
stage.¹⁶¹ThefateoftheotherGermanmemorandaproposalswassimilar.Due
totheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWarinthefollowingyear,thereportswereout-
datedgiventhedevelopmentsontheEuropeanbattlefields.However,thepredic-
tionregardingtheneedfortotalmobilization,thetendencytowardslongercam-
ColmarvonderGoltz,“EinigeBalkan-Kriegserfahrungen,”DerTag,12November 1913.
[Dietrich]Veit,“AusdemBalkankriege1 912 ,”Undated.BayHStAIVGS 25 9;seealsoVeit,
“KavalleristischeErfahrungenausdemBalkankriege,”MWB 20 (1913),cols.4 19 – 42 2.
172 ndsessionof 28 June 1913 ,Reichstagsprotokolle 1912 volume1 4 – 8, 5906 rigthcolumn.
Simon-Eberhard,“DreiKavalleriedivisionen 191 4zuwenigaufgestellt,”DOB 15 (19 25 ), 11 7.
GermanlessonsfromtheBalkanWars 63