THE STALLED INTERACTION 183The Soviet talks delegation in Stockholm had complained about dom-
ineering interference by the General Staff.^24 Although Shevardnadze
sympathized, only the General Secretary had the authority to face
down Akhromeev. As the evidence mounted about how the General
Staff had been flouting his orders, Gorbachëv angrily confronted
Akhromeev at the Politburo on 24 April 1986: ‘Once the political de-
cision has been taken, there needs to be corresponding action. But
there is inertia at the [Stockholm] talks. Nobody displays initiative.’ He
threatened to fire anyone found to be obstructing the negotiations in
Stockholm, Vienna and Geneva.^25 He looked around the room and
asked whether anyone objected to what he had said. Silence prevailed.
Akhromeev had suffered a defeat, and everyone in the room knew it.
Gorbachëv had started to show the General Staff who was boss.^26
He did not feel strong enough to make changes in personnel at the
top of the armed forces. Not yet. Shevardnadze had a freer hand at his
ministry and sacked Kornienko for the ‘treachery’ of his collusion
with Akhromeev.^27 Two new first deputy ministers, Anatoli Kovalëv
and Yuri Vorontsov, were appointed. Both were known as reformers,
and Shevardnadze hoped that they had the strength of purpose to run
the ministry in Shevardnadze’s absence. (As things turned out, he was
to be disappointed in them.)^28 Kornienko was transferred to the Party
International Department as second-in-command to Dobrynin, who
was recalled from the Washington embassy.^29 Gorbachëv apparently
hoped to turn the International Department into something like a
National Security Council on the American model.^30 He was adept at
counterbalancing his most energetic fellow reformers. Dobrynin was
no unconditional enthusiast for radical change in foreign policy, and
perhaps Gorbachëv wanted to keep a second team in readiness in case
his first team ran into difficulty. It certainly made sense to have
Dobrynin on tap for his knowledge of American high politics.^31 And
several of the department’s veterans were pleasantly surprised at
his insistence that they should think for themselves and draft their
proposals without fear of reprisals.^32
Reagan’s administration did not make it easy for Gorbachëv. At the
end of March 1986 Washington demanded the expulsion of dozens of
Soviet spies who worked under the cover of diplomats at the United
Nations in New York. Such espionage was a long-standing genuine
problem that US administrations had overlooked. Protests arrived
from Moscow. Soviet official anger was of a confected nature; the