202 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
armed struggle.^28 Meanwhile Yakovlev persuaded Gorbachëv to make
an appeal to anti-war opinion in America by renewing his unilateral
moratorium on nuclear explosion tests. The idea was to make things
difficult for the hawks in the American administration.^29 Gorbachëv
needed little persuasion, and he could count on Ligachëv’s eager
support. Ligachëv ordered media editors to start an energetic cam-
paign to make it difficult for Reagan to continue to permit the testing
that had occurred through the spring in the Nevada desert. The USSR
was to seize the chance to present itself as the true promoter of world
peace.^30
For some months Gorbachëv himself had been hoping to shift the
Asian factor more towards the centre of his efforts in foreign policy.^31
On 28 July he used his trip to Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East to
announce the desire for a transformation of the USSR’s relations with
countries of East Asia. He highlighted the need for peace and
applauded the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement in this part of
the continent. He said it was time for America and the USSR to give
the same intensity of attention to Asia as they had to Europe. Though
he hardly praised the Americans, his speech was remarkably soft in its
criticisms. He also stressed the wish for a cooperative relationship with
China, suggesting that opportunities existed both in economic ties and
in space exploration. As surety of his good intentions he emphasized
that Moscow would keep only a minimal level of armed forces on its
Asian territory; he promised that there would be no increase in the
number of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles. He called for
the demilitarization of the entire Indian Ocean. He declared that the
Soviet leadership was ‘ready to bring the Soviet armies home’ from
Afghanistan. His proviso was that those countries that were funding
the rebellion against the Afghan government had to cease their inter-
ference. Gorbachëv was taking yet another sudden initiative. Speaking
by the shores of the Pacific, he revealed his impatience with the pace
of change in world politics.^32
The State Department had its own reasons for irritation about
the halt to progress. Whenever Shultz explained his difficulties with
Weinberger to the President, there seemed to be a meeting of minds.
The President never followed this up with action. By 5 August, the
exasperated Shultz had had enough and handed over a letter of re s-
ignation. By chance Reagan had a medical check-up scheduled for
that day. Chief of Staff Donald Regan rang Shultz at his home on the
Stanford campus and pleaded with him to stay on. Shultz replied: ‘It’s