SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK 215Shultz heard Akhromeev joking: ‘Well, once again Soviet technology
comes to the rescue!’^35
Akhromeev seldom let his colleagues get a word in edgewise.^36 But
he worked tirelessly for a deal, and when tempers frayed, it was he
who called for calm.^37 Perle noted how hard he was trying. Nitze had
nothing like such pre-eminence over the American team. Indeed,
the sceptical Rowny pushed him into producing drafts that took no
account of Gorbachëv’s summer concessions. There was a pause in the
proceedings at 2 a.m., and the Americans repaired to Shultz’s room in
the Holt Hotel to gather their thoughts. Shultz felt annoyed when he
heard from Nitze’s lips: ‘I was opposed by my own delegation.’ The
decision was taken not to rouse Reagan from slumber. Instead Shultz
told Nitze to go back to the talks and get down to proper bargaining
when the two sides came together again at 3 a.m.^38 Nitze and Akhro-
meev achieved progress towards an agreed method for assessing the
size of each side’s strategic nuclear forces – a task of fiendish complex-
ity because so many diverse types and capacities of weapons were
involved. The snags were of a predictable nature. Akhromeev objected
to the Strategic Defense Initiative and Nitze to the USSR’s nuclear mis-
siles stationed in its Asian territory. Ten hours of debate ended without
a solution to such questions.^39
When Gorbachëv rose from his bed that morning, it was obvious
to him that only he and Reagan could break the deadlock. He reopened
the proceedings with the comment that just as the Bible said it took
seven days to create the world, the talks were only entering their
second day and there remained a lot of work for them to do. Reagan
replied that since it was a Sunday, perhaps both of them should be
resting from their labours.^40 After expressing regret about the impasse
in the working group, Gorbachëv assured Reagan that he was wrong if
he thought that the USSR had a greater need than America for arms
reduction. The Soviet leadership was not going to capitulate – and the
Reykjavik talks provided a chance that might not be on offer again.^41
After quickly consulting Shevardnadze, Gorbachëv announced that
the USSR would agree to keep only a hundred warheads in Asia. He
asked Reagan to match this concession with one of his own by com-
mitting America to adhere to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for a
further ten years. He pointed out that he had shown goodwill by
accepting the right of laboratory-based testing for the Strategic
Defense Initiative.^42 Reagan responded that the Defense Initiative’s