216 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
whole purpose was to render the treaty redundant by making nuclear
war entirely impossible. Neither would give way.^43
The President told the General Secretary that America and the
USSR could be ‘friendly competitors’ even though ‘each side mis-
trusted the other’.^44 He welcomed the fact that Gorbachëv, unlike his
predecessors, did not talk of a world communist state as his objective.
These comments failed to soothe Gorbachëv, who noted reports in the
media that Reagan still believed the USSR to be an evil empire. As
tempers flared, Shultz moved the discussion on to formulating a joint
statement on strategic and intermediate-range weapons. Gorbachëv
and Reagan could at least agree on this.^45
The two leaders felt sharp frustration, and Gorbachëv lamented
the historic chance they had missed. Reagan changed the subject
to human rights and economics. He asked why the USSR had failed to
buy the minimum of American wheat that the Long-Term Grain
Agreement required. Gorbachëv replied frankly that the collapse of
the world oil price restricted Moscow’s purchasing opportunities.^46
The closing meeting between President and General Secretary
took place that afternoon. Shultz had sat down with Shevardnadze in
a last attempt to find consensus on the Strategic Defense Initiative. The
two sides had narrowed the gap but ultimately failed to bridge it. Now
only a change of stance by Reagan or Gorbachëv could bring about
agreement. Gorbachëv wanted to try again. He read out a proposal to
confine all research, development and testing within the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty framework for a further five years – and the USSR and
America would halve the number of strategic offensive weapons in the
same period. He called for the total elimination of such missiles after
ten years. Reagan replied that he wanted America to be able to deploy
its Strategic Defense Initiative at that future point. Gorbachëv refused
any further compromise. There was stalemate.^47 Reagan could not see
why the USSR would object to the deployment of an exclusively de -
fensive system; Gorbachëv asked why the American would have need
for such a system once the world was rid of offensive nuclear weapons.
The two sides had come so close to sealing a deal that would have
definitively eliminated a threat that had hung over the world since the
late 1940s.
Turning again to the Defense Initiative, Gorbachëv pleaded with
Reagan to recognize that the next American President might change
any policy that he and Reagan agreed. The USSR needed to plan
on the basis of reliable projections. Reagan replied that he needed to