SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK 217obviate the danger of ‘someone who might come along and want to
redevelop nuclear missiles’.^48 He also asked why the Soviet authorities
were refusing to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk early-warning station; he
indicated that American forces ‘do not have a single defence against
nuclear attack’. In ten years’ time, he stressed, he himself would be a
very old man. He looked forward to returning to Iceland with Gor-
bachëv when each of them would bring his country’s last nuclear
missile with him and ‘they would give a tremendous party for the
whole world’. He joked he would never live to a hundred if he had
to worry every day about being hit by a Soviet missile.^49 An hour’s
break took place for each team to hold a final internal consultation.
At the resumption, Reagan referred to ‘the trouble Americans had
getting along with each other’.^50 The two leaders began to look on the
bright side. They were close to an understanding about strategic and
intermediate-range missiles and felt confident that the two delegations
in Geneva could work out the necessary details. Truly much had been
accomplished in the Höfdi House.^51
Gorbachëv, in a last effort, beseeched Reagan to concede on the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan said he could not go back on his
word to the American people; he denied that America wanted to
deploy weapons in space – and he affirmed the need to test the tech-
nology outside laboratories. Gorbachëv countered that the Initiative
would clearly involve space weapons. Reagan refused to give way.
When Gorbachëv asked whether this was his last word, Reagan said
yes and heatedly asked Gorbachëv to take cognizance of the American
political process. If Soviet citizens criticized the General Secretary, he
commented, they went to jail. Gorbachëv replied that Reagan ought to
look at some of the things now being written in the USSR’s press.
Reagan dismissed this as hyperbole and reminded Gorbachëv that
America’s political right, including its journalists, were ‘kicking his
brains out’. The Strategic Defense Initiative was anyway too dear to
him. Gorbachëv remarked that Reagan was but a few steps away from
becoming a great President who would not need to bother about
right-wing critics when the peoples of America and the Soviet Union
showered him with approval. Shevardnadze added that future gener-
ations would not forgive failure in Reykjavik. Still Reagan refused to
yield. He wrote a note to the Secretary of State: ‘George, am I right?’
Shultz wrote ‘Yes’ and underlined the word.^52
Their parting words had a poignant quality. According to the
Soviet record, Reagan said: ‘It’s too bad that we have to part this way.