THE SOVIET PACKAGE UNTIED 239nobody but Gorbachëv would benefit from such an outcome. Shultz
wearily concluded that ‘the ultimate shoot-out with Weinberger was
not far-off ’.^19
At the National Security Planning Group on 26 January Wein-
berger called for an interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
that would permit deployment of the Defense Initiative. As everyone
knew, this would wreck the talks with the USSR. It was decided to ask
the lawyer Abe Sofaer to conduct an impartial review of what the
treaty might or might not allow.^20 This failed to cool down Weinberger.
At the President’s meeting with his senior advisers on 3 February
he repeated his call for the right to deploy. Shultz had to leave
mid- discussion. Reagan in his absence mooted that America should
proceed to deployment without making a public disclosure. It took
National Security Adviser Carlucci to explain that this was unfeasible
without a change to the National Security Decision Directive of
October 1985, and that Congress would need notification. Reagan
continued to push the matter until Nitze warned against constitutional
impropriety.^21 Still Weinberger refused to accept defeat. The original
schedule was to introduce the Defense Initiative at the turn of the mil-
lennium. On 4 February Weinberger advised the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense that he expected America to be able to
deploy much earlier.^22 He also strove to toughen the CoCom restric-
tions by thwarting Soviet efforts to obtain products of biotechnology,
communication systems and kinetic energy.^23
Eventually Shultz put a hand on the steering wheel and wrote
firmly to Reagan, reminding him that ‘obviously, instantaneous
deployment is not even conceptually possible’. He pointed out that ill-
guarded statements could cause trouble in America and abroad. It was
imperative, he said, to enable Sofaer to complete his review unim-
peded. Shultz followed this up in conversation with the President,
laboriously going over the arguments until he felt sure that his boss
appreciated them.^24 He was forthright with the press about his scepti-
cism about the prospect for early deployment. Everyone knew that he
had Weinberger in his sights.^25
Shultz could take comfort from events around the world. The
Soviet leadership wanted to withdraw from its war in Afghanistan.
Eastern Europe was no longer frozen in changelessness. He sensed
that the Communist Bloc was beginning to crack up, and he asked the
Deputy Secretary in the State Department, John Whitehead, to make a
series of visits to the region. (Shultz had to surmount unease in the