240 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
State Department and the National Security Council about the possi-
bility that Whitehead’s tours might enhance the credibility of the
communist leaders.)^26 West European leaders shared Shultz’s feeling
that opportunities existed to increase influence in Eastern Europe, but
the question was how to go about this. Mitterrand urged caution. As
regards Poland, he reckoned that Jaruzelski was preferable to any of
his likely successors. Kohl advised Mitterrand that Gorbachëv could
make it easier to liaise with Honecker. He was under the impression
- a false impression – that the East German leader enjoyed a high rep-
utation in the Kremlin; he also suggested that Husák had an enhanced
scope for manoeuvre in his policies. On a practical level, Kohl wanted
to increase aid to Poland. Probably he and his intelligence agencies
were not as ill-informed as might now appear – his real game plan was
to persuade Mitterrand to accept what the West German government
wanted to do.^27
Western initiatives on the USSR itself were in short supply as the
American administration remained in internal dispute and Reagan
failed to engineer approval for a clear plan of action. Insofar as the
President had a strategy, it was to wait for the Soviet leadership to
yield to the requirements he had set out in Geneva and Reykjavik. This
suited Weinberger, who on 11 January 1987 told the press that he
would not mind if the Moscow summer summit was called off.^28 He
suggested that the Strategic Defense Initiative should complement the
American nuclear arsenal and not replace it; he spoke as if Reagan was
wrong to aim at eliminating atomic warheads.^29 Weinberger warned
about the USSR’s secret programmes to develop a ground-based anti-
missile system within the next three years.^30 Appearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 February, he predicted that
America would soon be adopting the new broad interpretation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He said nothing about the Sofaer review.
He gave the impression that his personal preferences were already offi-
cial policy.^31 Speaking to the New York Times on 24 February, he said
he believed the Defense Initiative system could be brought into service
as early as the year 1994. He stressed: ‘A lot of people think that we
have not decided to do this. The President wants to deploy.’^32
Independent scientific advice quietly cast doubt on Weinberger’s
prognosis. The Science Research Laboratory’s Thomas H. Johnson,
sceptical as ever, advised Matlock in the National Security Council
that deployment was unlikely to be achieved any earlier than the turn
of the century. The problem was that Weinberger was relying on infor-