242 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Gorbachëv hardly knew what hit him at the next Politburo on
26 February. After itemizing the problems in Geneva, he could only
propose to invite Shultz to Moscow to discuss the obstacles. This failed
to impress Gromyko, who repeated the case for change in the Soviet
negotiating posture. He advocated an unbundling of the USSR’s nego-
tiating package so as to enable the question of intermediate-range
nuclear missiles to be dealt with separately. Gromyko made no apology
for having once championed the installation of the SS-20s in Eastern
Europe.^35 He failed to convince Gorbachëv, who described Reagan as
only pretending to want world peace while threatening the USSR with
the Strategic Defense Initiative.^36 Ligachëv supported Gromyko’s side
of the argument – something without precedent in the Politburo.^37
Yakovlev joined everyone else. While continuing to praise Gorbachëv’s
tactics at Reykjavik, he sent him a memo arguing that the situation
had changed since Irangate. Now the best way to win over world
opinion and make it difficult for Reagan and Weinberger to forestall
a treaty with the USSR was to untie the package. If the Americans
refused to negotiate, their intransigence would damage their reputa-
tion. Yakovlev scoffed at those Western Sovietologists who forecast
material ruin and popular discontent: he predicted a great economic
future for the USSR.^38
The Politburo was asserting its supremacy, and it would have been
unwise for the General Secretary ignore it when both conservatives
and reformers were so united against him. After a lengthy discussion
he gave in and adopted what Gromyko was recommending. Nothing
like it had happened since 1985. The Politburo knew how much this
was demanding of him: he was surrendering a position that he had
fervently defended for over a year. But he had seen sense at last, and
the Politburo had no hesitation in agreeing to the change of policy.^39
No public announcement was made. The leadership desired to pre-
serve its image of imperturbable calm. But some kind of message had
to reach the Americans if the changed stance was to have any impact.
An arcane method was devised. Two days later, on 28 February, Gor-
bachëv issued a statement to the Western powers as Chairman of the
USSR Defence Council. For the first time he spoke of the Strategic
Defense Initiative without mentioning research and testing. Now his
only gripe was against future deployment.^40 He had to hope that the
White House would welcome his move and resume talks in a con-
structive spirit. Surely Reagan would see how much he had moved in
the direction of compromise.