THE SOVIET PACKAGE UNTIED 243Although Gromyko had led the way in arguing the case at the
Politburo, he was a declining force. What had occurred was a victory
for the Shevardnadze line. Shevardnadze himself declined to celebrate.
He understood the need to protect the General Secretary’s prestige
if perestroika was to succeed. Whenever his aides carped about the
inconsistency in Soviet foreign policy, he shut them up and told them
to accept the idea of ‘not everything immediately’. He was willing to
play the long game.^41
Reagan proceeded with caution as he reflected in his diary on
Gorbachëv’s overture: ‘It looks good but we mustn’t get too carried
away until we see how far they’ll go on verification.’^42 He refused to be
bounced into direct negotiations as had happened in Iceland. He
anyway had his hands full with the aftershock of Irangate. When writ-
ing to friends, he hardly mentioned the USSR for several weeks while
the American media’s preoccupation was with the scandal about
Colonel North, Tehran and the Nicaraguan Contras.^43 There was a
growing public concern about his Soviet policy. Gorbachëv was
pleased to hear in March that six former US defence secretaries had
signed a letter to the President and Congress calling for adherence to
the traditional interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Sena-
tor Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee,
supported their initiative.^44 Reagan still declined to budge. But he did
at least decide to send Shultz to Moscow to scout the opportunities.
Not everyone in the administration was pleased about the trip, and
some suspected that Shultz might offer undue concessions. Wein-
berger advised the President to limit the Secretary of State’s negotiating
licence in the Soviet capital.^45 Reagan agreed with this and on 9 April
signed an order prescribing what Shultz could say and stipulating the
need to stay within the bounds of earlier directives.^46
Weinberger stuck to his opinion that patient toughness towards
the USSR had proved its effectiveness. Gorbachëv had cracked once
and should continue to receive the same treatment. Premature conces-
sions were not in the American interest.^47
Others in the administration were inclined to assume a more con-
structive stance. The decision was taken to expand trade with the
USSR, and approval was given for the export of gas and oil industrial
equipment.^48 Pressure had been applied by American manufacturers,
who resented how the Japanese were signing contracts while they had
to hold back.^49 But the administration remained annoyed that the
Soviet state had failed to fulfil its obligation to buy a regular quota of