244 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
grain from Midwest farmers.^50 Fresh talks on the subject took place
from February 1987.^51 Since the moment that Reagan revoked the
cereal export embargo, the USSR had become the second biggest
market for American grain, and the White House was sensitive to the
domestic agricultural lobby.^52 Every American official was aware of
the reasons why Moscow had failed to honour its obligation. The
Saudis for their own internal reasons were flooding the world market
with their petrochemical exports, and the result was a prolonged
depression of the price paid for Soviet energy products. The Ameri-
cans discerned the implications without drawing drastic conclusions.
Always the concern was that the Politburo might prove able to ignore
its budgetary malaise and rejoin the arms race with America. Wash-
ington was going to take no chances.
Shultz brought a personal letter from Reagan to Moscow, and
Gorbachëv was delighted about its conciliatory tone. Reagan still com-
plained that ‘much more needs to be done’ about human rights and
that the dialogue on regional conflicts had been quite ‘fruitless’;^53 but
at the same time he was eager to make progress towards an arms
reduction agreement. The problem for Gorbachëv was that America
was increasing its stocks of short-range rocketry – including Lance
missiles – in advance of the time when both sides would eliminate all
such missiles. Although Shultz felt he could give way on this matter, he
made a fresh demand about ‘sub-limits’ for other categories of nuclear
weaponry. Gorbachëv immediately accused him of pulling back from
the Reykjavik understandings. Shultz made no attempt to contradict
him; he also refrained from answering a direct question about whether
America and the USSR in his opinion had attained ‘strategic parity’. He
laid emphasis on the realistic possibilities of striking an important
deal.^54 Gorbachëv failed to mention his own recent offer to unbundle
his arms talks package. Instead he asked Shultz to appreciate how flex-
ible he had been in Iceland in consenting to laboratory research for the
Strategic Defense Initiative. As if sensing that he was in danger of
spoiling the atmosphere, he assured Shultz that he was still ‘willing to
look for compromise on the basis of such an approach’.^55
Gorbachëv claimed to have chided the Americans by saying: ‘And
what’s happening? Nothing. Are you capable of anything or not? Your
behaviour is politically inexplicable. You insist that you are observing
important changes in the USSR, but you do not make any corrections
to your policies.’ He had rebuked Shultz and the President for treating
the USSR’s latest proposals like a bowl of porridge that was too hot to