170 The Postwar Period
Tito also hoped to include in his federation the new “people’s democracy” of
Albania, which his government recognized on 28 April 1945. One of his cher-
ished ideas was the creation of a great socialist entity in the Balkans, to which
other “people’s democracies” would be attracted. He was convinced that Yugo-
slavia could become a communist hub and that he could achieve socialism
more swiftly than the Soviet Union. He also wanted to solve the Macedonian
question, reuniting (under his command, naturally) the three parts of Macedo-
nia—the Yugoslav “Vardar,” the Bulgarian “Pirin,” and the Greek “Aegean”
regions of Macedonia, which had been torn apart on the eve of the First World
Wa r.^113 In June 1946, Tito and Dimitrov met in Moscow and agreed to resume
discussion on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation as quickly as possible. Stalin
agreed, convinced that together the two countries could play an important part
in the region. They also spoke about this project during Kalinin’s funeral, decid-
ing to mobilize in earnest after Bulgaria had signed the peace treaty. When this
happened at the beginning of 1947, it seemed there was no longer any impedi-
ment to the plan’s realization, though the treaty would not come into force
until 15 September.^114
In July 1947, a meeting was held at Lake Bled, Slovenia, between Tito and
Dimitrov, who had left Moscow and returned to Sofia to lead his country
after the war. On August 1, in an atmosphere rich with Slavic sentiment, the
two signed a historic protocol committing to close economic collaboration,
including a common currency and joint customs services. It was to be kept
secret, however, as Bulgaria had not yet formally regained full sovereignty. They
even spoke of a possible union between Vardar and Pirin Macedonia, and of
the Macedonian people’s right to self-determination—including the people of
Aegean littoral. During a confidential conversation, Dimitrov went so far as
to declare, “We will create a better Federation than the Russians, because our
culture is superior.”^115 Meeting with Bulgarian journalists, Tito emphasized
that “together with the Soviet Union, the Balkans will be a beacon, showing the
way to solve ethnic and social problems.” At a session of the CPY, he added
that “Yugoslavia was the only true herald of ‘revolutionary socialism.’”^116 Tito
felt invincible, convinced that he could create a powerful state in the Balkans
capable of achieving independence from the Soviet Union and destabilizing
the way in which the three great powers had divided the European southeast.^117
When Dimitrov told Stalin what had happened at Bled, his fury was instan-
taneous: he sent telegrams to both leaders, accusing them of having signed an
indefinite pact of collaboration, and observing that this was a highly irregular
kind of diplomacy. Most of all, he was troubled by the discovery that they had
acted without consulting the Soviet Union and without waiting for the imple-
mentation of the peace treaty. In doing so, they had given the West an excuse