The Presidential Years 349
considering it necessary for socialism in that country. Returning from Japan,
Mongolia, and Iran, Tito unwillingly took part in a secret meeting convened
by Brezhnev in Moscow between 28 and 30 April 1968, to consult the leaders of
the Warsaw Pact on how to respond to events in Czechoslovakia, where the
leadership was attempting to modernize the country under the slogan “social-
ism with a human face.” In practice, this meant a version of socialism closer to
Yugoslavia’s than to the Soviet Union’s. On that occasion, a heated debate arose
between the secretary general of the CPSU and the marshal, who expressed the
opinion that the use of force would have “catastrophic” effects. In saying this,
he intentionally used the same language that he had used ten years earlier, after
the Hungarian Revolution. “Why do you Yugoslavs so fear the word ‘interven-
tion?’” asked Brezhnev. “Should we wait until they start to hang communists
in Czechoslovakia, like in Hungary in 1956? History will not forgive us if we
will remain idle in the face of anti-communist forces, watching the funeral of
socialism without reacting.... Take care, Broz,” he added menacingly, “that
something like what’s happening in Czechoslovakia does not happen in your
house!” Tito responded to this last remark angrily, stressing that the situation in
Yugoslavia was completely different, since he had settled with the enemies of
the revolution at the time of the resistance. With regard to the threat to social-
ism in Czechoslovakia, he recalled that in his youth he had worked in the fac-
tories of that country and knew its proletariat well. He was certain that it would
be able to hold off its enemies and to defend the achievements of socialism.
They needed to trust Alexander Dubček, the secretary general of the Czecho-
slovak party, and the local intelligentsia, which was always on the side of the
communists.^468
In spite of this exchange of opinions, which did not promise anything
good, Tito returned to Belgrade hoping that the Soviets would not use force to
solve their differences with the Czechoslovaks.^469 Convinced that “the Prague
Spring” would be a “passage to a superior form of socialism,” he tried to orga-
nize a meeting with Dubček to show the socialist world that every country had
a right to its diversity.^470 The Ninth Plenum, convened on 16 July, affirmed that
the working class and other Czechoslovak socialist and progressive forces were
called to judge the situation in their country for themselves, without foreign
intervention, and to solve their own problems.^471 Kardelj followed the events
with great interest, stressing that the Yugoslavs should not be overtaken by the
innovations happening in Czechoslovakia. Soon, however, he began wondering
how the excessive radicalization of the Prague Spring would end up. Together
with many party “liberals,” he was of the opinion that the system could be
reformed “from above” by the party itself and not “from below” by the people.^472