Tito and His Comrades

350 The Presidential Years

Tito, too, feared the resurgence of anti-socialist elements in Czechoslovakia.
At Brezhnev’s urging, he visited Prague from 9–11 August 1968 to persuade
Dubček and his collaborators not to skip steps in their frenzy to reform. At
a press conference, however, he supported the democratization process in the
country and therefore was hailed triumphantly by the population. In the fol-
lowing days, together with the Romanian president, Nicolae Ceaușescu, he did
everything he could to prevent the Warsaw Pact from intervening against the
Czechoslovakian heretics. To this end, he contacted Brezhnev, Kádár, and other
socialist leaders, who assured him that no intervention should be feared.^473
These words were bound to be refuted in the days that followed.

August 1968

The Warsaw Pact forces, the Romanians aside, entered Czechoslovakia on 21
August 1968 to fight the “counterrevolution” in the name of international soli-
darity. This “defense of the results of socialism” was seen in Yugoslavia as a
warning of a possible invasion on their own soil. During the following two
days, the federal government and the Central Committee of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia firmly condemned the military intervention as an
“aggression,” an “occupation,” and a “brutal interference in internal Czecho-
slovak affairs.” The five countries involved, especially the Soviet Union, were
reproached by the Yugoslavs for having tried to stop the development of social-
ism in Czechoslovakia. Tito declared that it was absurd to speak about a “coun-
terrevolution” because no such thing existed, as he himself had been able to see
during his visit to Prague.^474 For him, the intervention of the Warsaw Pact was
a heavy blow since in recent years he had often maintained that Western dis-
trust of the Soviet Union was the result of imperialist propaganda. He lamented,
“Where possible, I tried to contradict this opinion, but now, everything has
been destroyed.”^475 In a TV appearance, he did not hide his disillusion: “For-
eign mili tary units coming into Czechoslovakia, without the invitation and
approval of the legitimate government, worried us very much. With this, the
sovereignty of a socialist state has been trampled, and all the socialist and pro-
gressive forces of the world have suffered a heavy blow.”^476
The failure of Czechoslovakia’s “socialism with a human face” created a strong
impression in Yugoslavia, which had followed the Prague Spring with interest
and sympathy. The Soviet Union, accused of neo-Stalinism and Russian chau-
vinism, was the subject of popular protests and a hostile press campaign. Moscow
and other capitals of the Warsaw Pact countries responded that the Yugoslavs,
in their anti-Soviet outbursts, were completely in tune with the West and
with Chinese. These menacing accusations prompted Tito and his comrades to
prepare the population for a possible armed attack. Their fear increased after