70 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
should be his concern: “The whole party today is an instrument of war: today,
every member of the party is mobilized as a red soldier.”^106 “The real signifi-
cance of this telegram,” Tito told Dedijer:
became clear only later. If we would do as Moscow wanted, we could never de-
velop our insurrection. In our condition, this directive would signify the liquida-
tion of the uprising even before it started. On 6 April, the old regime, with the
king at its head, abandoned the Yugoslav peoples to the mercy of the conquerors,
and what was left of the state’s apparatus passed to the service of the occupiers.
This demonstrated its fragility, abandoning the historic Yugoslav tradition of
fighting for national independence, confirmed in 150 years by thirty-nine revolts
and ten wars against foreign forces. In Yugoslavia, a popular revolt against the
occupiers was unimaginable as it would not assure the people that they would
be given a chance, after the war, to have a new truly patriotic government with
an administration that was firm enough not to allow Yugoslavia, in spite of her
natural riches, to resist colonization by the great powers, to hold fast against
ethnic oppression, and to see that the majority of the people would no longer live
in misery.^107From the very beginning of the liberation struggle, Tito’s revolutionary pro-
posals fanned the flames of his disagreement with Stalin, who refused to con-
sider the fight with Hitler in ideological terms, considering it an aggression
against Mother Russia and proclaiming it a “Great Patriotic War” (comparing
it with the “patriotic war” against Napoleon nearly 150 years before). Tito real-
ized that the only way to mobilize and unite the Yugoslav masses in a common
uprising was to create a strong chain linked by different patriotisms—their
ethnic loyalties were too divergent—with the messianic promise of a better life
and justice after victory. It is significant that he ignored Dimitrov’s message,
and turned his attention to immediate practical tasks. The Politburo, called to
session on 27 June 1941, transformed the Military Committee into the General
Staff of the Partisan units for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, naming
Josip Broz its commander-in-chief. On 4 July, it decided to move from acts
of sabotage to a general popular revolt. “There was enthusiasm and great joy,”
Tito later recalled.^108 And further: “At a time when fascism was dominating
Europe, when no voice was heard aside from the CPSU [the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union], the CPY raised the revolutionary banner, leading the
working masses, the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia into a victorious
fight of national liberation, of socialist revolution, honorably showing its revo-
lutionary and internationalist spirit.”^109