World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 71
On 4 July 1941, in order to light the spark of the revolt, the CC CPY sent
twelve emissaries to different parts of the country, stressing “brotherhood and
unity” and the equal dignity of all Yugoslav nations. For the communists, the
ethnic question was primarily of tactical significance in their search for power,
but they succeeded in exploiting it for their own ends, taking the Soviet expe-
rience as a model.^110 In Croatia, where love for the fatherland was stronger than
party discipline, they met with an unexpected obstacle. With the Wehrmacht
advancing in Belarus and the Ukraine, the communists assiduously listened to
Radio Moscow, which said nothing about the war, speaking instead about life
in the kolkhozes (collective farms) and about Stakhanovites (shock-workers
whose performances were well above the norm).^111 Why in the world should
the Croatian communists not believe that everything was in order on the East-
ern front, and that the Red Army would be in Zagreb in two, or at most six
weeks? Why should they not hail the breakup of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet
Union had stopped recognizing on 8 May 1941? For nearly a month, Andrija
Hebrang, leader of the Military Committee of the Croatian CP, could not
decide whether or not it was opportune to fight the occupiers, as ordered by the
Comintern and the CC CPY.^112 According to Vladimir Dedijer, Hebrang held
talks with important people from the Ustaša regime with the aim of creat-
ing an independent Croatian party. It seems that, during a meeting in June, he
even declared that the NDH was the realization of the secular dream of the
Croatian people.^113
In that moment of uncertainty Moscow condemned this “cowardly and
treacherous” behavior through Dimitrov, who asked Kopinič to overthrow the
leadership of the Croat party and take over so that sabotage activity against the
Wehrmacht could begin as soon as possible.^114 However, Kopinič’s attempts
were unsuccessful, for they were opposed by the upper echelon of the Croat
Pa r t y.^115 The consequences of the ensuing chaos were tragic. The Croats believed
that it was essential to show that they were ready for action. On the night of
13–14 July, the Zagreb City Committee decided to organize a mass escape of
prisoners still held captive in the castle of Kerestinec. A few days earlier, the
Ustaša had shot three of them as hostages and threatened to kill others in case
of further sabotage. According to Kopinič, it was better for the prisoners to
fall fighting, during an attempt at escape, than to wait passively for death. The
undertaking was so badly organized, however, that sixty-eight people, the
flower of the Croat leftist intelligentsia, lost their lives.^116
Tito immediately reacted to this failure by sending a commission of in-
quiry to Zagreb and, on 10 August, he summoned the Politburo to Belgrade.
The entire Croat CC was reprimanded for “its indecision and lack of vigi-
lance.” A week later, Walter (the name he still used in contacts with Moscow)